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ABSTRACT
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO NEXT GENERATION INFRASTRUCTURE
DATA ELICITATION AND PLANNING USING SERIOUS GAMING METHODS
Ersin Ancel
Old Dominion University, 2011
Director: Dr. Adrian Gheorghe

Infrastructure systems are vital to the functioning of our society and economy. However,
these systems are increasingly complex and are more interdependent than ever, making them
difficult to manage. In order to respond to increasing demand, environmental concerns, and
natural and man-made threats, infrastructure systems have to adapt and transform. Traditional
engineering design approaches and planning tools have proven to be inadequate when planning
and managing these complex socio-technical system transitions. The design and
implementation of next generation infrastructure systems require holistic methodologies,
encompassing organizational and societal aspects in addition to technical factors. In order to do
so, a serious gaming based risk assessment methodology is developed to assist infrastructure
data elicitation and planning. The methodology combines the use of various models,
commercial-off-the-shelf solutions and a gaming approach to aggregate the inputs of various
subject matter experts (SMEs) to predict future system characteristics. The serious gaming
based approach enables experts to obtain a thorough understanding of the complexity and
interdependency of the system while offering a platform to experiment with various strategies
and scenarios. In order to demonstrate its abilities, the methodology was applied to National
Airspace System (NAS) overhaul and its transformation to Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen). The implemented methodology yielded a comprehensive safety assessment
and data generation mechanism, embracing the social and technical aspects of the NAS
transformation for the next 15 years.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background

The world is heavily dependent on various critical infrastructures in areas like
transportation, communication, water, energy, banking and finance, etc. Critical infrastructures
are "national infrastructures [...] so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a
debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States"(U.S. Congressional
Research Service, 2003, Jan. 29, pp. CRS-2). Today's critical infrastructures1 are large-scale
systems, comprised of multiple components, involving various stakeholders, technologies,
policies and social factors (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008; Mayer, Bockstael-Blok, & Valentin,
2004). The interplay between the technology, users and policy makers creates the sociotechnical aspect of infrastructures. Infrastructures inherently evolve over time to address
changing needs by adapting and evolving to new situations, often not known in advance
(Janssen, Chun, & Gil-Garcia, 2009). In recent years, various sociotechnical systems started to
undergo a series of transitions. The definition of system transition is given as "a long-term
fundamental change (irreversible, high-impact and of high-magnitude) in the cultures (mental
maps, perceptions), structures (institutions, infrastructures and markets), and practices (use of
resources) of a societal system" (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008, p. 1). In other words, the
transition includes "a structural change in both technical and social subsystems" (Chappin &
Dijkema, 2008, p. 1). These transformations are mandated by increased performability,
sustainability and environmental efficiency requirements. However, modernization of these

This dissertation uses APA Style
Within this dissertation infrastructures and critical infrastructures are used interchangeably
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infrastructures is being held back for reasons besides economics (Geels, 2005). Because large
infrastructures like power, transportation, and communication contain multi-dimensional
complexity and are essentially stable, transforming the existing systems to more efficient
alternatives is challenging (Roos, de Neufville, Moavenzadeh, & Connors, 2004). The need to
comprehend infrastructures at the societal level and understand technical, political and
economic factors' interaction becomes more and more prominent (Hansman, Magee, de
Neufville, Robins, & Roos, 2006).
The planning and implementation phases of such large-scale infrastructure transitions
require close monitoring of performance parameters like safety, efficiency, and sustainability.
Ensuring that infrastructure transition reveals a safer and more sustainable system has become
a major challenge for society (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005; Luna-Reyes, Zhang, Gil-Garcia, &
Cresswell, 2005). In order to do so, decision makers often need to test various strategies and
perform analyses to characterize risk and other parameters. However, past strategies and
historical data regarding previous infrastructure systems are no longer adequate for next
generation infrastructure systems design because (1) previous systems evolved via incremental
changes and system improvements which lead them to be unsustainable (i.e. congestion, energy
shortage, air transportation delays, etc.) and (2) previous infrastructures were made to last and
were robust but resistant to change which causes challenges (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005;
Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008; Hansman, et al., 2006). Additionally, the increased presence of
societal aspects in the socio-technical system structure causes complications in understanding
and foreseeing solutions. The evolutionary nature of infrastructure systems and the everchanging societal dynamics make every problem essentially unique, rendering historical data
somehow ineffective (Brewer, 2007; Janssen, et al., 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973).
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The lack of empirical data causes decision makers to heavily rely on expert opinions for
next generation infrastructure planning (Chytka, Conway, & Unal, 2006). The current research
aims to develop a systemic framework to understand socio-technical systems and develop a
test-bed for alternative scenarios while generating data. The goal is to help collect experts'
opinions and aggregate data regarding the future state of the system while enhancing multilevel
complexity communication among stakeholders. For that purpose, a serious gaming based
platform is supported by various commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) software solutions to generate
a simulation environment. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is used as
a case study to demonstrate and validate the proposed methodology within the present work.

1.2

Future's different

Rittel and Webber (1973) state that past problems that 'professionals' (educators, housers,
city planners, highway engineers, decision makers, etc.) solved were definable, understandable
and consensual problems. Professionals were hired to eliminate undesirable conditions and
reach the commonly preferred system state. Given the clear definition of the problem, during
the 19th century, planners were able to solve issues like paving streets, connecting cities,
eliminating dreaded diseases, delivering clean water to the majority of the population, providing
social services to every city, etc. However, once these trivial engineering and decision making
problems were dealt with, the more stubborn problems emerged. Besides the efficiency
concept, equity was now being considered as a measure of accomplishment. The nation's
pluralism and the differentiation of public values annihilate the idea of consensus. As the
infrastructures evolved to their current states of interacting open societal systems, the
traditional engineering design approaches tailored to solve technical issues were no longer valid
(Rittel & Webber, 1973).
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Besides the changing public dynamics and complexity of future systems, due to
globalization, de-regulation, upcoming environmental concerns, and issues with the world
economy, the future shape of infrastructures are more and more uncertain (Wenzler, 2008).
Nowadays, each sector is facing varying degrees of discontinuous and rapid shifts in technology,
deregulatory pressures, demand fluctuations, natural and human threats to operation, along
with impacts of information technology on human factors, and shifting societal needs and
expectations (Hansman, et al., 2006). The problems that businesses and organizations are facing
are also becoming increasingly dynamic, ill-defined and complex with many variables and
interactions. Given the reasons above, the future status of man-made systems like energy,
transportation, warfare, agricultural or any other infrastructure cannot be predicted for
prolonged timeframes. The next generation of infrastructure systems will be considerably
different than the current system (Brewer, 2007).

1.3

Next Generation Infrastructures

A general definition of an infrastructure can be given as an essential system to the
functioning of the economy (Bekebrede, 2010). Infrastructures include public and quasi-public
utilities and facilities, and they are used by a large number of users (Janssen, et al., 2009). A
more detailed description can be given as "infrastructures are facilities and their operations and
the operating and management institutions that provide water, remove waste, facilitate
movement of people and goods, and otherwise serve and support other economic and social
activity or protect environmental quality (National Research Council, 1995, p. 121)."
Infrastructure systems are viewed as socio-technical systems where hardware and software are
the components of a more complex system, encompassing people, work processes, institutional
and cultural factors (Luna-Reyes, et al., 2005).
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Infrastructure systems have to evolve as performance requirements and demand
constantly increase over time. The capacity increase coupled with better efficiency
requirements mandate a constant modernization of infrastructure systems (Bekebrede, 2010).
As a result, new technologies with promising capabilities were developed. Examples of these
alternatives are the advances in nanotechnology, molecular biology, next generation energy
sources or advancements in aviation.
Traditional infrastructure modernization includes adding these technologies to the existing
infrastructure. Also known as incremental innovations, this method includes conventional
technology development that takes place at the micro-level of systems (Hansman, et al., 2006).
In fact, most current infrastructure systems evolved via incremental innovations where the new
technologies that are developed are the variants of the existing systems that can be
implemented without extensive instruction or training (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005). Such
infrastructure modernizations have been difficult, ineffective and inefficient to maintain.
Consequently, a number of current infrastructure systems are unsustainable, showing signs of
congestions, energy black-outs, flooding, etc (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008). It is believed that
current infrastructure system deficiencies are related to the incremental innovation that took
place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005;
Hansman, et al., 2006; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Elzen and Wieczorek argue that, instead of
modernizing the infrastructure systems via incremental innovations, it is necessary to adopt the
concept of "transitioning" the system which is defined as "a long-term change in an
encompassing system that serves a basic societal function [...] where both technical as well as
the social/cultural dimensions change drastically (Elzen & Wieczorek, 2005, p. 651)." The next
generation infrastructure systems require a systems approach, addressing the infrastructures at
societal as well as technological levels. It is imperative to include multiple perspectives and
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multiple disciplines in methodology development since real-world problems do not exist
independently of their socio-technical, political, economic and psychological contexts. Hansman
et al. pointed to the lack of rigorous methods for developing, evaluating and evolving future
infrastructure architectures able to integrate legacy elements while also responding to new
technologies, knowledge and demands (Brewer, 2007; Hansman, et al., 2006, p. 3). The next
section will highlight the approach taken within this research to reach the aforementioned goal.

1.4

The need for a New Approach

Due to the presence of interdependency, multi-dimensional complexity (see Section 2.2.2)
and societal factors, determining the system parameters of next generation infrastructure
systems becomes a challenging task. Uncertainty -defined as the inability to determine the true
state of a system caused by the lack of incomplete knowledge and random variability- is a major
component in next generation infrastructure development (Chytka, 2003; Roos, et al., 2004).
However, uncertainty is a much more prominent factor in large-scale infrastructure design
versus the traditional engineering undertakings. Compared to specific engineering component
designs (e.g. design of a power plant or a bridge) infrastructure systems (like electric power
distribution, roadway network or internet) last longer and include more stakeholder interaction
causing more uncertainties. Traditional engineering projects contain specific design parameters,
mandated by clients, governmental requirements or design codes. The challenge in these
projects is to optimize the output to meet the predetermined set of criteria. On the other hand,
due to the presence of various competitive stakeholders, shifts in public perceptions and
changes in the political environment affect the design requirements of infrastructure systems.
Besides the unknown stakeholder strategies and the future political shifts, energy or
transportation infrastructure planners are also unaware of the system-specific parameters like
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fuel prices, future customer demand, upcoming technologies, etc. (Vriesa, Subramahnianb, &
Chappinc, 2009).
Decision makers, planners, and investors often rely on speculative knowledge and reach
out for subject matter experts for their opinions (Ayyub, 2001; Chytka, 2003; Meyer & Booker,
1990). Current literature holds numerous structured expert elicitation methods. Expert
elicitation methods are often used in obtaining quantified data in situations in which it is
impossible to make observations due to technical difficulties, lack of resources or uniqueness of
the problem (i.e. infrastructure systems design) (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). Consequently,
traditional expert elicitation techniques perform best when used in traditional engineering
problems. In these problems, the final state of the project, general requirements and objective
are enclosed. It is possible to develop a prototype/model to test the acquired data with a
simulation and observe the outcomes. However, when it comes to eliciting socio-technical
systems, the societal part of the problem creates a challenge. These types of problems, due to
their nature, don't allow planners to test their solutions. Each decision making strategy, after
being implemented, can result in consequences for an extended period of time. The
consequences of such decisions need to be observed across the social and technical aspects of
the problem.
The problems associated with infrastructure development often come from both technical
and social issues. For that reason, the interface between the two must be understood properly
in order to develop an infrastructure transformation capability while embracing uncertainty
(Hansman, et al., 2006). Creating a methodology aiming to outline the decision pathways of
future systems and plan accordingly, while taking into consideration the technical,
organizational, contextual and evaluative complexity of the system, also requires fundamental
understanding of these interactions (Brewer, 2007; Hansman, et al., 2006).
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There is a need for an approach to adequately create a venue for infrastructure expert
elicitation environment, allowing both the societal and technical aspects of the problem to
surface, while enhancing communication throughout the stakeholders. Hansman et al.
emphasize the need for rigorous methods for developing, evaluating, and evolving future
infrastructure architectures incorporating legacy elements along with the introduction of new
technologies, knowledge, and demand. Such a method requires being flexible to reflect the
latest process in infrastructure transformation and transparent enough for decision makers to
enhance system understanding.
The present research concentrates on developing a comprehensive methodology in order
to support the infrastructure transformation by enhancing the stakeholder communication. The
methodology utilizes a set of models and tools in order to help the decision making process of
designing and evaluating scenarios for future technological implementations. The methodology
consists of using a comprehensive, yet intuitive, risk calculation approach used in process
industries, coupled with scenario-based serious gaming platform. The subject matter experts'
opinions are collected for both stages, namely during the development and implementation of
the methodology. This approach aims to substitute the need for historical data, by using a
combination of subject matter expert (SME) opinions and projected scenarios, to help create a
multitude of probable futures. The meaningful "experimentation" capability was developed over
NextGen in order to demonstrate the feasibility of such an approach and obtain data regarding
the future phases of the system with the help of several approaches and commercial-off-theshelf solutions present in the engineering management toolbox (Hansman, et al., 2006).

1.5

Problem Domain

In order to implement the aforementioned methodology, NextGen development consisting
of a system-wide upgrade of the National Air Transportation (NAS) is taken into consideration as
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the problem domain. The NAS is a complex global system with many public and private
stakeholders involved with national defense, homeland security, commercial and general
aviation and future commercial space transportation (JPDO, 2007).
During the Bush Administration, in 2003, Congress took a significant step toward
transforming the current Air Transportation System (ATS) via the Vision 100 - Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act, mandating the advent of NextGen. The Vision 100 Act also created
a unique cooperative partnership between public and private stakeholders such as the
Department of Transportation (DoT), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Commerce
(DoC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Aeronautics and Space Administrator
(NASA), the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and industry
stakeholders by forming the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) (JPDO, 2008a). JPDO
is charged with developing concepts, architectures, roadmaps, and implementation plans for
transforming the current national ATS into the NextGen.
NextGen goals include flying an increased number of passengers, cargo and types of aircraft
more safely, precisely and efficiently, while using less fuel and creating less environmental
impact. It is envisioned that by 2025, JPDO will manage a complete overhaul to the system,
shifting the navigation and surveillance from ground-based to satellite-based solutions.
Additionally, voice communications will be substituted by digital data exchange, and weather
forecast delivery systems will be tied to a single authoritative source (FAA, 2009). According to
the above document, during the next two decades the goal is to achieve a system that:
•

can provide two to three times the current air vehicle operations;

•

is agile enough to accommodate a changing fleet that includes very light jets (VUs),
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and space vehicles;

•

addresses security and national defense requirements; and

•

can ensure that aviation remains an economically viable industry (JPDO, 2007).
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The implementation of NextGen related technologies began in 2005 and already received
vast criticism including cost and schedule risks along with management challenges (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2010b). The NextGen transformation was selected as the
problem domain for this research due to its high-level complexity and involvement of numerous
stakeholders while experiencing complications on both social and technical aspects.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will cover the main literature used to build the methodology for this research.
This section will highlight the relevant aspects of systems thinking, complex infrastructure
systems, system transition studies, serious gaming approach, and finally the uncertainty and
expert elicitation.

2.1

Systems Thinking

The capability of accelerating and steering complex socio-technical transitions became one
of the chief concerns of developed countries. A complex system is "a bounded set of richly
interrelated elements for which the characteristic structural and behavioral patterns that
produce system performance emerge over time and through interaction between the elements
and the system interaction with the environment" (Keating, Souza-Poza, & Mun, 2004, p. 3).
Transitioning from any current tightly coupled and complex infrastructure (e.g. electricity power
infrastructure) for any reason (e.g. for fighting global climate change or eliminating dependency
on imported oil, thus vulnerability, etc.) will pose great challenges for policy-makers since these
infrastructures are decades old, fully matured, highly networked and relatively efficient systemof-systems (e.g. the existing petroleum based supply chain with massive inertia) (Bush, Duffy,
Sandor, & Peterson, 2008).
Human history is packed with examples of attempts (and failures) to guide transitions at
the meta-system level. For instance, although the United States spends more money on
healthcare than any other nation in the world, the country's uninsured population, infant
mortality and life expectancy levels fall behind other developed nations. In a similar fashion, the

12
war on drugs had a small impact on cocaine cultivation, production and smuggling, despite the
billions of dollars spent each year (Sterman, 2006). From the environmental aspects, levees and
dams aimed at controlling flooding led to even more severe floods due to the disruption of
natural excess water dissipation. Such examples not only were unsuccessful in achieving the
desired state of the system, they also caused more damage to the existing setup.
Policy resistance, as described by Sterman (2001), is the side effect of any intervention
aimed at transforming a system where interdependences and complexity are not fully
understood. Sterman states that "you can't do just one thing" and "everything is connected to
everything else" (Sterman, 2001, p. 9). The solution is the ability to see the world as a complex
system, that is, systems thinking. Once a holistic worldview is adopted, it is argued that learning
will be much faster and efficient, leading to the ability to understand the leverage points in the
system and finally avoiding the policy resistance. However, even systems thinking and systems
engineering are currently challenged to address increasingly complex systems due to the (1)
elevated levels of interdependency and interoperability, (2) potentially radical requirements
shifts caused by factors beyond technical aspects like policy or organizational funding, and (3)
presence of an exponential rise in demand and accessibility of information (Keating, et al.,
2004). Evolution of the systems engineering field yielded to the System-of-Systems (SoS)
concept in order to develop more robust approaches as complexity and interdependency of
future infrastructures increase (Adams & Keating, 2011). The definition of SoS is "a Metasystem,
comprised of multiple embedded and interrelated autonomous complex subsystems that can be
diverse in technology, context, operation, geography, and conceptual frame .... These complex
subsystems must function as an integrated Metasystem to produce desirable results in
performance to achieve a higher-level mission subject to constraints" (Keating, 2005, p. 1).
Consequently, system-of-systems engineering (SoSE) is defined as "the design, deployment,
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operation, and transformation of metasystems that must function as an integrated complex
system to produce desirable results" (Keating, et al., 2004, p. 5).
Researchers quickly grasped the idea of treating large socio-technical transitions from a SoS
perspective. The complex and interdependent characteristics of infrastructures led to the
adoption of a SoS approach within the transition body-of-knowledge and innovation studies
(Bush, et al., 2008; DeLaurentis, 2005; Gheorghe, Masera, Weijnen, & De Vries, 2006; Hansman,
et al., 2006; Pfaender, DeLaurentis, & Mavris, 2003; Pruyt & Thissen, 2007). DeLaurentis (2005)
argues that decision-makers within government and industry cannot gain adequate insight from
conventional analysis methods that are designed to study a constrained part of the problem:
"Current frames of reference, thought processes, analysis, and design methods are not
complete for these SoS problems" (DeLaurentis, 2005, p. 1). The need for a holistic framework
enabling decision-makers to judge upcoming reflections for the infrastructure design, policy
considerations or technology adoptions is crucial (DeLaurentis, 2005; Sterman, 2001). Hansman,
et al. (2006) point out that developing integrated socio-technical models and methodologies are
necessary to describe the interactions between the technical infrastructure and its social
context. The current research aims to develop this capability by developing a test-bed for
technical, political, and economic factors interaction and uncertainties by adopting the holistic
approach of systems engineering methodology given in Chapter 3.

2.2

Complex Infrastructure Systems

Infrastructures, defined as the "underlying foundation or basic framework," are man-made
constructs to deliver and/or distribute utility services (energy, water, mobility) to the masses.
They are considered to be capital-intensive large-scale systems consisting of physical and
organizational interlinked components. They allow interaction of many actors (e.g. system users,
developers, owners, policy makers, etc.) with often conflicting diverse objectives, means and
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strategies (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008; Loorbach, 2007; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001).
The future generations of these infrastructure systems will increase in size, scope, and
complexity. A complex system can manifest itself with numerous elements or subsystems, has a
high level of interrelationships between the elements or subsystems, and contains a high degree
of hierarchical levels (Bekebrede, 2010). With the increased system complexity, subsystem and
component interactions increase, yielding more unexpected emergent properties and
unanticipated consequences. Consequently, the system interpretations regarding the problem
context get more diverse due to biased and distorted views brought by an increased number of
individuals or stakeholders (Brewer, 2007; Roos, et al., 2004). Depending on the issues
considered, each stakeholder provides its own perspective and interpretation, seriously
affecting decision making processes and systems operations2.

2.2.1

Interdependency

Another prominent characteristic of complex infrastructure systems is interdependency.
Dependency is a unidirectional linkage between two infrastructures where the state of one
infrastructure is directly correlated to the other (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Examples of dependency
are the power and telecommunications utilities. Telecommunication infrastructure requires
power to operate, but the opposite is not necessarily true. On the other hand, interdependency
designates a bidirectional relationship between infrastructures, connected as a system of
systems. Power infrastructures and water utilities are interdependent on each other where
water, necessary for cooling purposes, is controlled by pumps and lift stations which in turn
require power. There are four types of interdependencies: physical, cyber, geographic, and

As Gheorghe (2004) stated, complex infrastructure systems are threatened with systemic risks,
large-scale risks with trans-boundary ramifications, characterized by three major challenges; complexity,
genuine uncertainty and ambiguity. These risks inhabit at the intersection of numerous aspects of critical
infrastructure systems, namely, natural events, economic, social, and technological developments within
a policy-driven environment.
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logical interdependencies 3 . The NAS and the aviation system, as a part of the transportation
infrastructure, also contain these interdependencies among airports, airline companies as well
as other stakeholders and entities.

2.2.2

Complexity

Future infrastructure systems will experience a multi-dimensional complexity. In general,
the complexities can be categorized under t w o main types, technical/physical and
social/political complexity, where the main difference in these t w o is the presence of
quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors (See Table 2-1, Adapted from Mayer, 2009, p.845).

Table 2-1 Technical/Physical and Social/Political Complexities (Mayer, 2009)

Technical/Physical Complexity

Social/Political Complexity

Quantifiable factors

Non-quantifiable factors

Many interdependent variables (system
complexity)
Cognitive uncertainty

Many interdependent, loosely coupled stakeholders
(multi-actor complexity)
Disputed or contested knowledge, values and norms
Strategic behavior to optimize own interests, making
use of loop holes in the policy
Dynamic rounds and arenas; volatile, erratic policymaking processes
Accepted solution, negotiated knowledge, political
compromises
Soft tools: participation, process management, think
thank meetings

Emergent behavior (e.g. counterintuitive)
Design phases (linear of iterative steps of
building and using model)
Best solution, best available knowledge,
optimization, validity, fidelity
Hard computer tools: simulations, models,
decision support systems

Physical interdependency, as the name implies, arises from the physical linkage between the two
infrastructure systems, e.g. railroad transportation and electric power generation. Fuel necessary for the
power generation is delivered via railroad, which requires power at all times to operate rail signals,
switches and controls. Cyber interdependency implies the information transfer between systems,
increasingly used in all infrastructure systems with supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems utilized in electric power grid control. Geographic interdependency relates to the physical
proximity of two or more infrastructure systems where a local environmental event can create
disturbances in all the systems. A recent example for the geographic interdependency is the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake in Japan where the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants experienced meltdowns caused by
tsunamis. Finally, logical interdependency can be determined where one infrastructure is linked to
another one without the presence of physical, cyber, or geographic connection. An example of such
interdependency is the link between electric power and financial infrastructures. Electricity market
deregulation legislation passed in 1996 lead to power crisis in late 2000 in California (Rinaldi, et al., 2001).
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Roos et al. (2004) further detailed complexity: technical complexity, organizational
complexity, contextual complexity, and evaluative complexity. Technical complexity involves the
design of infrastructure systems, inherently more complicated than the primitive versions,
aimed at solving trivial engineering problems. Besides the traditional engineering performance
criteria like performance and cost, designers also consider sustainability, flexibility, adaptability,
safety, security, vulnerability and robustness. Organizational complexity arises from the nature
of large-scale infrastructure systems involving numerous organizations from public and private
sectors along with non-governmental organizations. Managing the process and information
flows, configuration of human resources between these organizations with different corporate
culture and values is a challenging task. Contextual complexity involves the internalization of so
called externalities that are often left out while designing traditional engineering. Evaluative
complexity surfaces when the large array of stakeholder groups involved in or affected by the
design of the infrastructure systems have different perspectives (Roos, et al., 2004). The
evaluative complexity is stemmed by the presence of numerous social parameters in the
infrastructure design. The next section will provide more details on social aspects of the
problem.
Throughout the maturation of the present research, previous studies associated with multidimensional complexity of technical systems were performed. One of the studies involves the
integration of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) integration to NAS (Ancel & Gheorghe, 2008).
Although proven beneficial on several areas of application, the integration of UASs to NAS is
considered a rather challenging task due to technical, societal, and political interdependencies
inherently present within the airspace. The study investigated employing object-oriented
programming (OOP) to demonstrate the multi-layer complexity of the integration plan while
introducing a "business process" concept. For that purpose, UAS-NAS integration was modeled
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using TopEase® software which is developed upon the OOP paradigm. The model was able to
provide a full visualization of the integration phases, covering aspects like safety, security, air
traffic management, regulation and socio-economic issues, allowing stakeholders or decision
makers to examine the different layers of the process while observing the overall safety and
performance parameters (see Appendix A4)

2.2.3

Socio-technical Issues

The complex socio-technical systems such as large-scale infrastructures are separated from
common engineering tasks by the presence of a large number of mutually dependent public and
private stakeholders with different perceptions, interests, values, and objectives (Bekebrede,
2010; Luna-Reyes, et al., 2005; Mayer, et al., 2004). Problems with a social context are more
complex given the number of non-simple interactions among the components and players:
In such systems, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, not in an ultimate
metaphysical sense, but the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of
the parts and the laws of interaction, it is a non-trivial matter to infer the properties of
the whole system (Brewer, 2007, p. 160).
Planning problems where technical, social and economic characteristics are intertwined are
inherently challenging and require different tools in order to understand their inner workings.
Sociotechnical contexts must be designed in systemic, e.g. they adopt the idea that all aspects of
a system are interconnected and they all should be addressed jointly. A difference in emphasis
on any of the components during the design phase (e.g. technology over social aspects) will
cause the system to underperform (Clegg, 2000). Rittel & Webber (1973) coined the phrase
"wicked problems" for such planning problems, essentially different from the pure technical
problems that scientists and engineers deal with. Problems found in the natural sciences (or

Appendix A includes further details on the complex structure of UAS-NAS integration problem.
Experience gathered from working with OOP and agents helped shaping the present research framework
by assigning characteristics to different objects such as participants (or stakeholders), laws, and
regulations, fuel prices, terrorist activities for the case study which will be covered in Chapter 4.
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technical problems) are definable and separable, and their solutions are obtainable. On the
other hand, problems related to social and policy planning are ill-defined, and they depend upon
political judgment and common consensus for resolution. The next generation infrastructure
planning problems contain the societal aspects Rittel & Webber define as "wicked," in addition
to the multi-dimensional complexity that is synonymous with such systems. Rittel & Webber
classify the problems engineers and scientists focus on as "tame" or "benign" where the mission
is clear. These problems are clear in definition regardless of their complexity or whether they
can be solved or not. On the other hand, planning-type problems are malignant in nature
because they don't have a definitive formulation, they have no stopping-rule or there is no way
to test the solution.
The presence of multiple stakeholders with various agendas creates policy resistance,
arising from dynamic complexity. Dynamic complexity is an often counterintuitive complex
system behavior caused by the interaction of agents over time (Sterman, 2000). Depending on
the issue at stake, various perceptions, diverse interpretations and proprietary assumptions
create diversity which is not necessarily a positive thing given the persistent lack of time and
resources associated with modernization of complex infrastructure systems (Brewer, 2007). The
presence of societal factors creates wicked problems where the solution requires understanding
the problem, yet the problem cannot be understood ahead of time without tackling it first. The
modernization of next generation infrastructure systems involves understanding the different
levels of complexity involved with such systems.

2.2.4

Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)

Infrastructures are often designed to meet certain criteria, arising from the needs of
society. The new elements of infrastructure systems are engineered with the influence of
various stakeholders during the development phases. Infrastructure systems evolve and adapt
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to the changing environment when users adopt new services and functions (Janssen, et al.,
2009). The adaptation of the complex ensemble of users and organizations occurs as a result of
the learning process, happening at multiple levels. Due to the characteristics mentioned above,
infrastructures are often viewed and analyzed as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) (Bekebrede,
2010; Janssen, et al., 2009; Lei, Bekebrede, & Nikolic, 2010; Rinaldi, et al., 2001).
CAS are systems that have a large number of components (often called agents), adapting
and learning as they interact with each other. Challenges like controlling the internet (viruses
and spam), understanding markets, predicting changes in global trade, strengthening immune
systems all represent CAS. Consequently, the agents of CAS can be from a wide array of
contexts, namely cells, species, individuals, firms, nations, etc. and any coherent behavior
emerging stems from the cooperation and competition amongst these agents5.

2.3

System Transitions Studies

Several bodies of knowledge focused on understanding, planning, and forecasting future
technological innovations affecting infrastructure systems. Researchers and policy makers
investigated the technological advancements and how the transition from old technology to
new ones occurred. Throughout history, mankind witnessed numerous technological
substitutions. For instance, the fuel source for the energy sector was substituted many times:
from wood to coal, to hydrocarbons (or fossil fuel), to nuclear fuels, and to renewable energy
sources (Fisher & Pry, 1971; Geels & Schot, 2007). Similarly, electric vehicles, internal
combustion automobiles and hybrid sources were substituted back and forth for personal

The agents' interactions are often non-linear and system behavior cannot be deducted from the
component behavior. The general characteristics of CAS are the presence of the adaptive agents
(dynamic stakeholder behavior, learning and adapting to new conditions), co-evolution (entities evolve
partially depending on each other), and the emergent behavior (new structures, patterns, and properties
arise, e.g. self-organization) (Bekebrede, 2010; Holland, 2006; Morowitz & Singer, 1995). Bekebrede also
demonstrated that serious gaming methods adequately address the CAS behavior of complex
infrastructure properties. Serious gaming will be elaborated on Section 2.4.
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transportation as technology advanced. In order to understand and model such transitions both
quantitative and qualitative methods have emerged6.
Researchers investigated numerous infrastructure and transition related phenomena using
the aforementioned methods in energy, transportation and aviation infrastructures. Examples of
such work include the EU Energy System including the evaluation of several electricity
generation technologies (Geels & Schot, 2007; Pruyt & Thissen, 2007) or market penetration of
fuel cell vehicles in the German automotive market (Keles, Wietschel, Most, & Rentz, 2008) or
biofuel usage in U.S. transportation infrastructure (Bush, et al., 2008). The air transportation
infrastructure was also modeled to investigate capacity growth (Miller & Clarke, 2007), taxation
strategies (Sherry, Mezhepoglu, Goldner, Yablonski, & Knorr, 2005), resource management
(Galvin, 2002), unmanned aircraft system integration (DeLaurentis, Cagatay, Mavris, & Schrage,
2001; Pfaender, et al., 2003) or technology integration (Mozdzanowksa et al., 2007;
Mozdzanowska, Weibel, & Hansman, 2008) issues. However, the studies cited above a) either
work with the current well-understood system dynamics, b) model the future phases of the
system only with a numerical approximation of societal effects or c) include solely the technical
aspects of the system under consideration. The comprehensive integration of social and
technical aspects of infrastructures cannot be represented with feedback models or object
oriented methods.
With these methods, researchers aim to define the complex relationships and long-term
behavior and policy resistance (Bekebrede, 2010; Mayer, 2009; Sterman, 2000). Although very

These methods were used for military planning purposes including logistics, convoy routing and
bombing raids during the Second World War. Following the Second World War, decision sciences
including operations research, systems analysis, and policy analysis were used to develop optimal
solutions for well-structured planning and management problems. Methods derived from applied
mathematics, modeling, game theory, decision analysis, and computer simulations were used to
investigate the effects of changing technological, economic and social environments. System Dynamics,
Cellular Automata, and Agent Based Models were developed to simulate complex systems where
sensitive parameters and unexpected behavior determination (Mayer, 2009).
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powerful in replicating past innovation trends and able to explain unexpected behaviors after
they have surfaced, simulation methods contain important drawbacks. Simulations do not
include the political and positional rationality of stakeholders and social actors in the model. It
is proven difficult to investigate feedback loops (e.g. system dynamics models) between causes
and effects in societal problems (van Dijkum, 2001). The stakeholders can only be a part of the
model once their behaviors are determined and quantified (Bekebrede, 2010). However, as
Rittel & Webber stated, in order to capture the societal aspects of the problem, the problem
needs to be understood in the first place (Rittel & Webber, 1973). The other drawback of
simulations is that they are often very complex and based on mathematical formulations,
making simulations "black boxes" for decision makers and infrastructure planners (Bekebrede,
2010, p. 12; Duke, 1974). The lack of communication between simulation designers and policy
makers creates a gap which has proven to be problematic and decreases efficiency of the model.
With the introduction of participatory modeling or group modeling it is possible to eliminate the
effects of a lack of communication between the modeler and the decision maker, but due to
their nature, computer simulations are unable to represent the dynamic and uncertain patterns
of societal behavior.
Besides numerical methods, another body-of-knowledge called Transition Management
(TM), emerged in the Netherlands. TM studies are involved in examining large sociotechnical
transformations such as global environmental change related to C02 emissions within the EU
(Chappin & Dijkema, 2008; Geels, 2002, 2005; van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005).
Sustainability within the transition process is one of the key components in TM research and the
goal is to empower and support ongoing sustainable development from a coherent and systemic
perspective (Loorbach, 2007). TM theory emphasizes that large-scale system change cannot
depend on technological advancements alone but also requires manual institutional and socio-
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cultural transformations. TM is build upon the multi-level perspective (MLP) of system
innovation (see Figure 2-1) 7 .
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Although it theoretically provides a framework for the transition process on large-scale
technological systems, T M research is on the conceptual level and lacks the explicit

The MLP is a framework to understand the inner workings of the system innovation occurrence and
to help determining certain patterns. MLP consists of three levels, micro-level (niche), meso-level
(regime) and macro-levels (landscape) and has a bottom-up approach. The technological niches are
situated at the micro-level where radical innovations (or variations) take place (Genus & Coles, 2008). In a
system transition, these innovations are linked together and stabilized. With the increased internal
momentum, the new configuration breaks through the existing dynamically stable ongoing process
through a window opportunity (i.e. congestion, environmental concerns, etc.) With the influence from
the new configuration, the socio-technical regime adjusts itself to accommodate the competition created
by the new technology. With time, the new technology replaces the old one and gets accepted at a wider
range.
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methodology to effectively learn and manage large-scale transitions. The MLP is presented as a
global model, unable to cater to the complexity and ambivalence of specific case studies (Genus
& Coles, 2008; Loorbach, 2007; van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005).

2.4

Serious Gaming and Policy Gaming

Over the last few decades, practitioners and management scholars increasingly criticized
the conventional strategy making methods, arguing that rapidly changing environments require
emerging and creative approaches. Serious gaming (simulation game or gaming, used
interchangeably within the text) discipline is found to be increasingly useful within mainstream
strategy literature involved with former strategy making approaches (Geurts, Duke, &
Vermeulen, 2007). A definition of gaming simulation is given as a representation of a set of key
relationships and structure elements of a particular issue or a problem environment, where the
behavior of actors and the effects of their decision are a direct result of the rules guiding the
interaction between these actors (Wenzler, 2003, pp. 146-147).
Serious gaming is an activity where two or more independent decision-makers seek to
achieve their objectives within a limited context8: "The participants (or the players) of the game
perform a set of activities in an attempt to achieve goals in a limiting context consisting of
constraints and of definitions of contingencies (Greenblat & Duke, 1975, p. 106)". These games
are labeled "serious" because their primary objective is educational and/or informative as
opposed to pure entertainment.

Serious games allow researchers to model problems with societal aspects which can often be found
in next generation infrastructure transition efforts. The advantage of simulation gaming over traditional
computer simulation models is that the stakeholders do not have to be represented by mathematical
formulations; instead, they are played by the participants themselves (Bekebrede, 2010). Representing
complex systems with serious gaming models save the model builders the need to build in the
psychological assumptions since they are represented by the stakeholders.
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Simulation games have many different forms and aim to provide insights for various goals.
The common point on each simulation game is that reality is simulated through the interaction
of role players using non-formal symbols as well as formal, computerized sub-models when
necessary. This approach allows the group of participants to create and analyze future worlds
they are willing to explore. Lately, large organizations reported serious gaming simulation uses
for their organizational change management efforts (Wenzler & van Muijen, 2009).
Duke (1974) argues that formal complexity communication methods are inadequate when
it comes to problems of the future due to their exponentially increasing complexity. He believes
that "the citizen, the policy researcher or other decision maker must first comprehend the
whole -the entirely, the system, before the particulars can be dealt with" (Duke, 1974, p. 10).
The serious gaming method approach with respect to other techniques is given in Figure 2-2.
Gaming simulation techniques can handle "many variables" and are distinguished from other
techniques by being relatively uncalibrated and intuitive (Duke, 1974, p. xv). Each serious game
is situation specific; consequently, they should only be performed within the intended and
designed context. Failure to do so will result in poor results9.

Researchers argue whether simulation and gaming is a standalone academic field of study or a
useful tool that can be used by other disciplines. The source of the ongoing debates is stemmed from the
interdisciplinary nature of these games. The simulation and gaming is certainly an advanced tool in
various areas like education, business, and urban studies, environmental issues etc. yet, to date, gaming
researchers are still working towards a common theory and an established field of academic study
(Shiratori, Arai, & Kato, 2003).
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2.4.1

Brief History

The earliest and the most common uses of simulation gaming are so-called war games
dating back to the 19th century and involved exploration, planning, testing, and training of
military strategies, tactics and operations in a simulated interactive and sociotechnical
environment (Mayer, 2009). With the emergence of decision sciences like operations research
(OR), systems analysis (SA), and policy analysis (PA), the early serious gaming efforts initially
received large skepticism. However, simulation and gaming methods (or soft systems thinking)
became an alternative to formal complexity modeling techniques like systems analysis, systems
dynamics and operational research. These techniques were successfully applied to wellstructured problems; yet, when considering the ambiguous and often ill-structured and complex
systems, their contribution was limited since adequate theory and empirical data were absent.
Serious gaming methods are able to provide decision makers with an environment in which the
totality of the system and its dynamics are present. With a holistic approach that includes the
wide-range of perspectives, skills, information, and mental models of the involved parties, the
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quality of the decision-making environment increases dramatically (Geurts, et al., 2007;
Wenzler, 2008).
In the late 1940s the RAND Corporation (Research and Development) created methods for
systems and policy analysis to improve governmental decision making. Although gaming alone
was still not considered to be a scientific approach within the policy analysis toolbox, the
decision making society saw gaming as the 'language of complexity', a very useful approach to
designing computer models. Several European Nations, especially the Netherlands, practiced
various gaming exercises and gaming styles like spatial planning of the country at the national
scale (participants played the roles of private and public investors, governmental licensers,
stakeholders, and citizens). In the late 1990s, a large number of scientists leaned into the
computer-based simulations given the developments on that platform. They adopted the
concepts and technology derived for games for entertainment purposes and developed games
like SIM HEALTH (U.S. Health care simulation), SPLASH (water resource management), and
NITROGENIUS (multiplayer, multi-stakeholder game aiming to solve nitrogen problems). By
2000, games started to be employed for purposes like healthcare, policy making, education, etc.
with the adoption of the oxymoron, serious games (Mayer, 2009).

2.4.2

Serious Gaming Uses

Serious games are developed to serve several different purposes. However, the most
important contribution of gaming methods is their ability to enhance communication among
various actors. This lead researchers to utilize gaming methods intensively in complex system
exposition where complex systems with social aspects are examined (G. Bekebrede, Mayer, van
Houten, Chin, & Verbraeck, 2005; Duke, 1974). Policy-gaming exercises carry various objectives
like understanding system complexity, improving communication, promoting individual and

27

collective learning, '

creating consensus among players, and motivating participants to

enhance their creativity or collaboration (Geurts, et al., 2007). Policy games are often used in
understanding complex infrastructure systems which will be covered within the next section.

2.4.3

Serious Gaming and Infrastructure Design

The complexity involved with system transition of large infrastructure systems is given in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The discrepancies associated with such infrastructure transitions are
related to the lack of understanding of societal aspects of these systems. For that reason,
several serious gaming exercises are developed to assist decision makers, experience system
complexity and train stakeholders. Serious games can represent the multi-level system
architecture by proprietary rules at the player level, interaction of the players, and the system
levels. The complexity associated with infrastructures (both the technical/physical and socialpolitical levels) is integrated within the gaming platform for stakeholders to experience an
abstract representation of the system and make informed decisions (Mayer, 2009). Several
infrastructure systems are represented using serious games.

Serious gaming methods are often used as an educational technique to train players from highschool students to professional emergency responders (Greenblat & Duke, 1975; Shiratori, et al., 2003).
Additionally, gaming methods are often employed in tandem with various fields; e.g. war-gaming,
business-gaming, policy-gaming, urban-gaming, etc. Policy-gaming exercises assist organizations in
exploring policy options, developing decision making and strategic change support. Such policy exercises
can be used in a variety of problems; from deregulating public utility sectors, to reorganizing the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, to restructuring cities with urban planning games, to investigating various policy
options for global climate change, to restructuring UK's National Health Care System, crisis management
at National Levels (Brewer, 2007; Crookall & Arai, 1995; Geurts, et al., 2007; Mayer, 2009; Wenzler,
Kleinlugtenbelt, & Mayer, 2005)
11
Games that are designed for individual learning can be categorized under three main objectives;
training participants for a situation/scenario, changing participants' mental model with increased
awareness, and attaining participants' support. Games where the collective learning is aimed three
categories of objectives are observed; discovering (understanding a situation and exchanging ideas),
testing (carrying out experiments to check the value or effectiveness of the options), and implementing
(realizing the organizational change for training purposes) (Greenblat & Duke, 1975; Joldersma & Geurts,
1998)
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Unlike hard-system methods, the gaming and simulation approach is quite flexible and
easily adaptable to other quantitative methods, scenarios, and computer models (Mayer, 2009).
Policy gaming methods can help both participants and modelers understand the big picture and
identify critical elements of the complex problem at hand. Because of the iterative and
experimental nature of these gaming and simulation environments, participants are able to test
different approaches within both a safe environment and a condensed timeframe (Wenzler,
2008). INFRASTRETEGO is an example of a serious gaming-based decision making tool, aimed at
encapsulating the Dutch electricity market. Game developers used the game to examine
strategic behavior in a liberalizing electricity market while examining the effectiveness of two
main types of regulatory regimes. Strategic behavior is the use of administrative and/or
regulatory processes such as stalling, delaying, or appealing interconnection negotiations,
engaging in anti-competitive pricing, or other methods that can be encountered within
liberalization of utility industries. Empirical research indicates that strategic behavior may affect
the level playing field and public values in a negative way. Overall, the game was able to identify
the undesirable, unintended and unforeseen effects of strategic behavior phenomena. Serious
gaming enabled monitoring and measurement of strategic behavior as it occurred since
participants did not have any fear of litigation and were able to report the development of the
strategic behavior which cannot be observed in real-world situations (Kuit, Mayer, & de Jong,
2005; Wilson et al., 2009)12.

12

Similar to INFRASTRATEGO, games like THE UTILITY COMPANY and UTILITIES 21, along with other
market, policy or performance simulation models are related to deregulation of utility companies
(Wenzler, et al., 2005). One example of a fully-computer based simulation game is SIMPort, involving
infrastructure planning and land designation for the extension on Port of Rotterdam. SIMPort is used to
support the actual decision making process characterized by high level of uncertainty, path dependence
and strategic stakeholder behavior, coupled with technical, political and external factors such as national
and global economy (G. Bekebrede, et al., 2005; Warmerdam, Knepfle, Bidarra, Bekebrede, & Mayer,
2006). Furthermore, games like RESCUE TEAM and KING OF FISHERMEN are examples of games geared
towards teaching and training of business ethics which were the causes of two major corporate accidents
in Japan's nuclear industry (Wenzler, et al., 2005).
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2.5

2.5.1

Uncertainty and Expert Elicitation

Uncertainty

Uncertainty is one of the core elements that need to be taken into consideration when
analyzing and designing next generation infrastructure systems. Sound risk decision strategy
formulations require prior identification and quantification of uncertainties (Chytka, 2003).
Uncertainty is defined as the inability to determine the true state of a system and is caused by
incomplete knowledge or stochastic variability (Chytka, p. 9). There are two types of uncertainty
in engineering, classified as internal and external. Internal uncertainty is caused by (1) limited
information in estimating the characteristics of model parameters for a given, fixed model
structure and (2) limited information regarding the model structure itself. External uncertainties
come from variability in model prediction caused by plausible alternatives, also referred to as
input parameter uncertainty (Ayyub, 2001; Chytka, 2003).
The design and implementation process of socio-technical systems does not contain
specifications, regulations or codes as in the case of designing traditional engineering systems.
Instead, designing for uncertainty requires that policy makers to make decisions in situations
where scenarios of competitive forces, shifts in customer preferences, and changing
technological environment are largely unpredictable (Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Roos, et al.,
2004). The uncertainty emerges from two sources: knowledge of the system and knowledge of
the social response. Table 2-2 outlines the four types of problems arising from these initial
conditions. As previously covered, large-scale infrastructure transitions are often considered as
wicked (or ill-structured) problems (located at the bottom-right hand corner of the table).
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Table 2-2 Uncertainty and Problem Types

Knowledge on
Technical & Physical
Parameters ->

High

Low

Knowledge on Social &
Political Parameters 4-

High

Substantial information on the system

Technical solutions are available but their

and its environment with substantial

consequences either create social conflicts

agreement on the objectives,

or they are not fully comprehended

solutions and effects (tame problems)

(untamed political problems)

There is no uncertainty or conflict
regarding the parameters or

Low

consequences on the social aspects,
however the knowledge on the
physical system parameters is limited
(untamed technical problems)

Little consensus on both the technical and
social aspects of the problem is present.
Solutions and their future consequences
along with the societal responses are
unknown (wicked problems)

Infrastructure planners and designers need to obtain data regarding the future phases of
the system transition. The required data for both developing the socio-technical transition
model and for governing risks should mostly be provided using expert judgment and elicitation,
which will be covered next.

2.5.2

Expert Elicitation and Aggregation Methods

Expert judgment is "Expert judgment data given by an expert in response to a technical
problem. An expert is a person who has background in the subject area and is recognized by his
or her peers or those conducting the study as qualified to answer questions" (Meyer & Booker,
1990, p.3). Expert judgment is used when information from other sources like observations,
experimentation, or simulation is not available. Subject matter expert opinions are often
employed on the estimation of new, rare, complex or otherwise inadequately understood cases,
future forecasting efforts, or to integrate/interpret existing qualitative/quantitative data (Meyer
& Booker, 1990). Multiple methods exist regarding the different elicitation techniques such as
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group interaction, independent assessment, questionnaires, qualitatively obtained data,
calibrating expert judgment data, knowledge acquisition dynamics, and learning process studies.
(Chytka, et al., 2006; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Gustafson, Shukla, Delbecq, & Walster, 1973;
Keeney & von Winterfeldt, 1989)
Large-scale socio-technical systems are made out of multiple components, involving various
stakeholders, technologies, policies and social factors (Frantzeskaki & Loorbach, 2008). The
multi-dimensional aspect of the next generation infrastructure systems requires decision makers
to take into consideration all the complexity and uncertainty associated with such systems
(Roos, et al., 2004). Decision and policy makers often require expert opinions to comprehend
and manage the complexity within such systems. The data regarding various subsystems within
the meta-system needs to be obtained from a group of experts and combined (or aggregated) in
order to assist the decision making process (Cooke & Goossens, 2004). Individual expert's
assessments are elicited and aggregated by mathematical and behavioral approaches (Chytka,
2003; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Cooke & Singuran, 2008). Aggregation algorithms such as the
Bayesian method13, Logarithmic Opinion Pool, and Linear Opinion Pool14 are used to combine
the expert opinions regarding a system with known results. However, for future events with
unknown results, behavioral methods and linear opinion pool were found to be more adequate
(Figure 2-3).

Bayesian approaches are used for subjective type of information where knowledge (i.e.
probabilities) is a combination of objective (prior) and subjective (obtained from the experts) knowledge.
Although subjective expert opinion is integrated into the knowledge, Bayesian method still requires prior
knowledge regarding parameter which doesn't exist for future events with unknown results (Ayyub, 2001;
Bedford & Cooke, 2001).
The opinion pool methods combine the elicited distribution via linear or logarithmic weighted
averages. The opinion pools have been used in fields like meteorology, banking, marketing, etc. where
there the experts weighting factors are validated with either historical data or the observance of the
event which was very near term (Chytka, 2003).
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Multiple Expert Opinions Elicitation
and Aggregation Methods

]
Known Results
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rNominal Group Technique
Decision Conferencing

Figure 2-3 Expert Elicitation and Aggregation Methods

The behavioral approaches seek to come to a consensus among the participants through
different forms of interaction including brainstorming, the Delphi Method 1 5 , the Nominal Group
Technique 16 and Decision Conferencing 17 (Ayyub, 2001; Cooke & Goossens, 2004; French, et al.,
1992). Behavioral approaches suffer f r o m different expert personalities leading to dominance
of certain individuals or group polarizations.

15

Delphi method was heavily used in 1960s and 1970s on long-range technological innovation
forecasting studies and policy analysis. The process involves an initial estimation session, followed by
discussions and revision of the initial assessments. Typically the opinions converge to a high degree of
consensus following two or three iterations (Meyer & Booker, 1990). The Delphi method is no longer used
as extensively since it does not carry uncertainty indicators and it falls short on complex system forecasts
with multiple factors (Cooke & Goossens, 2004).
16
The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) allows expert interaction by presenting and discussing their
assessments in front of the group. Following the discussions, each expert ranks the portrayed opinions
silently where the aggregated ranking of these opinions represent the consensus among stakeholders.
Scenario analysis revolves around two questions (1) how a certain hypothetical condition can be realized,
and (2) what are the alternatives for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process. Decision and event
trees along with respective scenario probabilities are used to predict a future state (Ayyub, 2001)
The decision conferencing is used to establish context and explore the issues at hand. It is used to
facilitate making decisions and reaching consensus on complex issues such as planning the events
following the Chernobyl disaster. Decision conferencing is often based upon multi-attribute decision
analysis (MCDA) and help simulate discussions and eliciting issues. Events are often short, two-day
conferences where the interested parties and experts gather to formulate and implement policy actions
to offer the best way forward (French, Kelly, & Morrey, 1992)
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The mathematical approaches covered above are often used to determine the technical
parameters of systems at hand including the performance or safety values of newly developed
systems. However, uncertainties resulting from the interdependency of stakeholder groups also
have to be considered when modeling next generation transition efforts. Similarly, behavioral
approaches received large criticism since participants of these methods had the urge to oversimplify their assumptions. Because complex systems often exhibit strongly counter-intuitive
behavior, researchers simply cannot rely on intuition, judgment, and arguments from experts
when eliciting behavioral data regarding complex systems (Linstone & Turoff, 1975): "[...]
everything interacts with everything and the tools of the classical hard sciences are usually
inadequate. And certainly most of us cannot deal mentally with such a magnitude of
interactions" (Linstone & Turoff, p. 579). Also, when it comes to employing experts to elicit
data, researchers often realized that specialists usually focus on the subsystem and mostly
ignore the larger system characteristics. The mathematical or behavioral aggregation methods
cannot be adequately used for gathering data from experts when it comes to large-scale system
transitions.

2.5.3

Serious Gaming and Data Generation

A literature review revealed a limited number of studies regarding use of serious games as
a data generation method. A study conducted by Rosendale (1989) employed role-playing as a
data generation method about the use of language in speech act situations. The study was
designed to reveal basic characteristics about how invitations within platonic and romantic
situations occur. The gaming method was the only adequate method to gather data in these
situations because authentic interactions cannot be observed without violating participants'
privacy. Although Rosendale states that the role-play method has been shown to be a valid and
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reliable method, the limitations of using this method brought up questions about its validity and
ability to represent real world interactions between humans (Rosendale, 1989).
Similar to Rosendale, Demeter (2007) also suggested using role-play as a data collection
method related to apology speech acts by analyzing how apologies take place in different
situations. Participants, chosen from English majors at a university from Romania, were
engaged in a role-playing environment and asked to apologize within the scenarios presented to
them. The naturally occurring discussions were collected and compared against another
method called discourse completion tests (DCT). The author concluded that in some instances,
role-playing produced more realistic data since it allowed participants to actually speak instead
of writing their responses and they were more authentic since a natural setting was created by
the scenarios (Demeter, 2007). Another qualitative study using role-playing to generate data
was conducted by Halleck (2007). The gaming method was used to evaluate a nonnative
speaker's oral efficiency using simulated dialogues. The biggest advantage of using role-playing
is given as its ability to simulate a real conversation environment without violating participants'
privacy.
Besides generating data for speech act studies, the only study related to data elicitation
was the REEFGAME, simulating the marine ecosystems in order to learn from different
management strategies, livelihood options and ecological degradation (Cleland, Dray, Perez,
Trinidad, & Geronimo, 2010). The data generation ability of the game was limited to the
decision-making processes of the stakeholders (fishers) which can be categorized under
collective learning regarding complexity, and it was not elaborated on any further.
Considering the studies above, the literature survey did not provide any intensive data
generation study conducted with serious gaming approaches, demonstrating the uniqueness of
the study at hand.
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CHAPTER 3

A METHODOLOGY FOR TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TRANSITION

The history of infrastructure development shows that the majority of the challenges
associated with transitions are related to social aspects, rather than technology related issues.
The pressure from various stakeholders with different agendas renders the infrastructure
transition rather challenging. For this reason, decision makers and other stakeholders must
experiment with design alternatives and their implications. Methodologies related to increasing
communication, understanding, and alignment among stakeholders from diverse backgrounds,
objectives and roles need to be employed in concert. Developing a model comprising these
interrelationships, along with the induced technical and social complexity is the main approach
of this research. The model should include drivers for change (new technologies, congestion,
decay, efficiency and reliability, changing needs, etc.), constraints (existing structure, cost,
environmental, social, and political impacts and externalities) and also context (government
intervention, stakeholder actions, social factors, economic and political opportunities including
developing new standards and protocols) (Hansman, et al., 2006).
The developed methodology in this dissertation consists of creating a platform capable of
integrating technical infrastructure transition and its social context. This platform is aimed to
serve both as an expert elicitation venue (similar to questionnaire or interviews in formal expert
elicitation methods) and as a means of aggregation (combining opinions from multiple experts
via approaches like the Bayesian method, opinion pools, etc.). Components of the proposed
methodology (serious gaming, expert elicitation, and complex infrastructures) and their
significance have been discussed in previous chapters. This chapter will provide a more holistic
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capture of the research methodology, design, development and execution of the elicitation
approach as well as discussions of its validity.

3.1

A System-of-Systems Engineering Methodology

The reasoning behind undertaking large and complex infrastructures such as the air
transportation system with a system-of-systems approach is given in Section 2.1 of the literature
review. As previously defined, the SoS understanding includes embracing and undertaking the
problem as a Metasystem, ensuring unison functioning of the interrelated and independent
systems (Adams & Keating, 2011). Consequently, within the case study covered in this
dissertation, the various systems constituting NAS (airlines companies, airports, government
organizations, public, etc.) are treated as part of a higher-level system in addition to their
internal structures.
The current research is geared towards developing a next generation infrastructure
planning and data elicitation venue to extract and aggregate expert opinions for large-scale
sociotechnical systems. As Keating et al. (2004) argued, a methodology provides a framework
and is more general than a detailed method or tool, yet more specific than a philosophy. This
framework should be designed to be effectively tailored in order to guide action. The
characteristic attributes of a SoS engineering based methodology identified by Keating et al. are
found to be suitable with the transformation efforts of large sociotechnical systems. The
attributes are adapted from Keating, et al. and are given in Table 3-1. Attributes were employed
to ensure that the proposed methodology meets the attributes of a system-based approach.
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Table 3-1 System-of-Systems Engineering Methodology Attributes (Keating, et al., 2004)

Methodology Attribute

Transportable
Theoretical and
Philosophical Grounding

Guide to Action

Significance

Consistency

Adaptable

Neutrality

Multiple

Utility

Rigorous

Methodology Attribute Description
Capable of application across a spectrum of complex systems engineering
problems and contexts.
Linkage of the methodology to a theoretical body of knowledge as well as
philosophical underpinnings that form the basis for the methodology and
its application.
The methodology must provide sufficient detail to frame appropriate
actions and guide direction of efforts to implement the methodology.
While not prescriptively defining "how" execution must be accomplished,
the methodology must establish the high level "whats" that must be
performed.
The methodology must exhibit the "holistic" capacity to address multiple
problem system domains, minimally including contextual, human,
organizational, managerial, policy, technical, and political aspects of a
system of systems problem.
Capable of providing replicability of approach and results interpretation
based on deployment of the methodology in similar contexts.
Capable of flexing and modifying the approach configuration, execution,
or expectations based on changing conditions or circumstances remaining within the framework of the guidance provided by the
methodology, but adapting as required to facilitate systemic inquiry.
The methodology attempts to minimize and account for external
influences in application and interpretation. Provides sufficient
transparency in approach, execution, and interpretation such that biases,
assumptions, and limitations are capable of being made explicit and
challenged within the methodology application.
Supports a variety of applications with respect to complex systems of
systems, including, new system design, existing system transformation,
and assessment of existing complex system of systems initiatives.
Capable of withstanding scrutiny with respect to: (1) identified
linkage/basis in a body of theory and knowledge, (2) sufficient depth to
demonstrate detailed grounding within the systems engineering
discipline, and (3) capable of providing transparent results that are
replicable with respect to results achieved.

The proposed methodology within the current research involves combining tools from
various disciplines: namely, serious gaming, risk assessment, expert elicitation, etc. Although it
was developed within the NextGen framework, owing to its modular nature, the methodology
may be adapted to suit different SoS level problems by modifying the embedded risk simulation
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mechanism or employing different COTS software adequate for the system at hand. The next
section will provide details of the developed methodology and its systemic approach.

3.2

Gaming Cycles

Considering the SoS engineering requirements given above, a modular, flexible, and
consistent methodology was created. The methodology consists of three phases: pre-gaming,
gaming, and post-gaming. Each phase is supported by 'add-ons', including formal expert
elicitation methods and ranking tools. With the help of these tools and techniques, data (both
quantitative and qualitative) are gathered regarding the problem at hand(Ancel, Gheorghe, &
Jones, 2010).
During the pre-gaming phase, it is necessary to collect all the gaming variables depending
on the modeled system. Such variables include scenarios, stakeholders and their interactions,
historical data regarding the system and information on the parameter(s) upon which the
success of the transition process will be measured. The computer based simulation mechanism
keeps track of the process throughout the gaming exercise. Depending on the application, the
computer based simulation can evaluate risk or reliability of an infrastructure system or keep
track of generation capacity or throughput of a certain utility. Once the adequate numerical
simulation mechanism and all the supporting data are collected, the game is developed.
Developing the game is an iterative process where versions are often tested by playing with
several groups and then fine-tuning.
The gaming cycle includes the execution of the gaming exercise with the participation of
experts. The game usually starts with the presentation of the scenario to the participants.
Participants are asked to perform according to their predetermined roles. Considering the new
information they have been presented, participants are asked to make collective decisions
about the investigated parameters. The decisions are taken as the input variables for the
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computer assisted simulation mechanism where initial conditions for the next step are
calculated. The iterative process enables participants to experience and shape the future phases
of the transition process. The presence of participants (preferably experts or real stakeholders)
social values, norms and beliefs provides the realistic input for the social interaction and the
decision making process.
The post-gaming phase of the methodology involves data collection and analysis which
surfaced during the gaming cycle. At this level the elicited data are arranged and presented back
to the participants for further analysis and feedback. Although not performed, depending on
the type of data elicited, it is possible to use several other types of COTS software to organize
and analyze the data. In order to illustrate the methodology described above, the example from
the problem domain, NextGen, was given in Figure 3-1. The high level gaming architecture of the
expert elicitation methodology within the problem domain context is given below.

Figure 3-1 Serious Gaming Methodology - High Level Gaming Architecture
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The problem domain is defined as 'determining the 2025 NAS safety values' by examining
the chief safety related NextGen enabler and technologies. Within the NextGen framework,
expert opinions and literature review provide scenarios, realistic timelines, involved
stakeholders, technologies and other components of the infrastructure that are being modeled.
The game cycles represent decision making milestones for these enablers. Data regarding
enablers' characteristics (i.e. cost, benefit, timeline, equipage risk, etc.) are inputted to a risk
simulation mechanism. This risk simulation mechanism is based upon an intuitive identification
and prioritization approach called Rapid Risk Assessment Model (RRAM) and is adapted to the
NextGen framework and embedded in the gaming cycle. The gathered data along with the risk
simulation mechanism are then embedded into the serious gaming architecture. The gaming
platform serves as the expert elicitation and aggregation arena since expert interactions from
various stakeholder groups enable a realistic debate environment for discussion and
examination of the social aspects of technology implementations along with technological
aspects. The ost-gaming phase of the methodology includes data analysis and validation. The
behavior knowledge generated throughout the gaming exercise, along with the 2010-2025
dynamic aviation risk values and alternative ranking constitutes the outcome of the elicitation
method. This knowledge is used as the input for the sensitivity and other analyses and becomes
the 'elicited data' of the proposed methodology. An overview of the components within the
method will be provided next.

3.3

3.3.1

Pre-Gaming (Data Collection)

Gathering Gaming Variables

Within this section data regarding NextGen scenarios, game rules, stakeholder roles, future
accident categories, NextGen enablers and technologies and their attributes are collected. By
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their nature, next generation aviation technologies and other parameters carry uncertainties
(e.g. advantages of a certain technology in 15 years, cost-benefit values, etc.). Consequently, the
data need to be obtained mainly by eliciting expert opinions.
For that purpose, a preliminary data gathering session based on single-point estimations
was organized during the development stage of the game where experts provided their opinions
regarding the benefits of future technology implementations (Cooke & Goossens, 2004). The
gathered data was later embedded in the gaming variables. However, traditional mathematical
expert elicitation methods are not fully suitable for this type of data generation since the data
cannot be verified in the near future and uncertainty indications should be present. The
literature survey concluded that the Linear Opinion Pool developed by Chytka, (2003) for the
cases where the results remain unknown for extended periods of time, is the most suitable for
this study18.
Besides the technical data requirements, game designers determine the current status of
the infrastructure system by gathering the most recent historical data in order to create an
initial condition for the game. Such data may include but are not limited to the anticipated
infrastructure transitioning approaches, apparent stakeholder rules (organizational structures,
etc.), existing accident categories or other values of interest that will be tracked down, etc.
Once the clues regarding the current status of the infrastructure and the anticipated
transitioning approach are determined, the general outlines of the scenarios need to be created.

The Linear Opinion Pool enables decision-makers (i.e. game builders or facilitators for this case) to
mathematically aggregate expert opinions with the lack of likelihood functions and expert creditability
assessments. The experts are queried regarding the unknown parameter and then asked to provide its
uncertainty assessment rating. The results are then aggregated and distributions on each parameter are
obtained. This methodology allows game designers to obtain data required for enabler ranking during the
pre-gaming section.
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3.3.2

Scenario Development

Scenarios constitute one of the main elements of complex models, simulations or serious
games. The scenario allows the modelers to create the environment in which the particular
system operates. Similar to other gaming parameters (e.g. the technological advancement
contributions or their timelines), the scenario to be investigated is often determined by subject
matter experts. In order to support strategic planning efforts, workshops, serious games, thinktanks or other behavioral expert elicitation techniques (Delphi Method, Nominal Group
Technique, etc.) are often organized (Jacobs & Statler, 2006; Wiek, Binder, & Scholz, 2006). An
example for such a study was conducted in 1997 by the National Research Council (National
Research Council, 1997). Experts from academia, aviation related public and private sectors,
scientists, consultants, the armed forces, and government agencies were able to determine five
scenarios with great depth for the next 15 to 25 years. Out of five chosen scenarios, the aviation
industry experienced three of the predicted futures, including the 9/11 attacks, a steep increase
in fuel prices, and the effects of the global market in aviation.
When constructing a scenario, the overall goal must be formed during the initial stage of
the process. Goal formation includes the determination of the expected results, system
boundaries, knowledge base, stakeholder functions, etc. Once the goal is clarified, the scenario
is constructed in an iterative manner. On the other hand, developing scenarios for gaming
purposes is highly dependent on the type of the simulation's goals. If the purpose of the game is
to offer policy recommendations or implications, the scenario has to play a dominant role. If the
purpose of the game is educational, the scenario must be able to promote creative thinking and
imagination in its participants (deLeon, 1975).
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3.4

3.4.1

Gaming Cycle

Serious Gaming as a Way of Understanding Infrastructures

Luna-Reyes et al. (2005) state that the presence of social and organizational factors can
cause up to 90% of the information system project failures, resulting in not delivering the
expected benefits. For that reason, it is crucial to integrate such societal factors into the design
of large-scale infrastructure design processes. As mentioned in Sections 2.4 and especially 2.4.3,
simulation gaming methods have recently shown promise in large-scale sociotechnical system
planning efforts. Their ability to integrate the social and technical aspects of infrastructure
development delineates these methods as the most appropriate candidate for creating a venue
combining computer assisted stakeholder interaction. In this way, serious games provide
insights into how to address issues arising from the interaction of players, roles, rules and
scenarios. Mayer describes serious gaming derived applications as " [...] a hard core of whatever
the computer model incorporated in a soft shell of gaming (usually through some form of roleplay)" (Mayer, 2009, p. 835). In order to support the case study, the RRAM described below is
used as the hardcore computer model to measure throughout the exercise19,20. The more
detailed demonstration of gaming methodology, Section 4.2, provides the gaming cycle
overview within the NextGen context.

Besides the RRAM, the commercially available decision support software, Logical Decisions® for
Windows (LDW) v.6.2, was selected as a supportive COTS add-on. The software assists the gaming
process by helping participants evaluate and prioritize among the available decisions they have
throughout the game (Logical Decisions, 2007). LDW's dynamic ranking capability of various alternatives
provides real-time support in selecting alternatives according to their parameters (e.g. cost/benefit
values, environmental impact, implementation risks and timelines, etc.). In the light of present
information at any given time, informed participants are encouraged to alter their value judgments,
visualizing the tradeoffs of each option before making their decisions.
20
In addition to LDW, other software packages like Precision Tree® and TopRank® from Palisade
Company were investigated for gaming support. This combination enables the graphical representation
of possible decision outcomes gathered from the serious gaming data gathering session using decision
trees and influence diagrams in an organized manner. TopRank® performs automated and multi-way
"what if" sensitivity analysis for the organized decision trees identified by the gaming process.
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3.4.2

Rapid Risk Assessment Model

The RRAM serves as the estimation and quantification of risk values, comprised of
separately calculated accident probabilities and their respective consequences. The probabilities
within the model are estimated via the Probability Number Method (PNM), and the
consequences are approximated via numerical manipulations. The RRAM is supported by
historical and expert elicited data as well as the gaming to numerically generate the risk values
throughout the methodology.
The RRAM was used as the risk simulation mechanism selected for the case study.
However, depending on the problem at hand, this model can be replaced with any adequate
software, method, or an existing study measuring aspects like network capacity, throughput,
financial status, etc. The adaptability of the gaming method allows developers to switch and/or
combine different approaches which will provide a systemic view of the problem. Details
regarding RRAM are given below.

3.4.2.1 Introduction
The RRAM was created through the joint effort of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNED), the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) under the
United Nations umbrella21. The model and the associated method were developed as an
affordable solution for a quick turn-around needed to determine risks associated with handling,
storage, processing and transportation of hazardous materials. The risk assessment
methodology (including the PNM approach) was supported by an extensive database containing
various types of substances (i.e. flammable, toxic, or explosive gases or liquids), safety
The director of this dissertation, Dr. Adrian Gheorghe, was a part of the Scientific Secretariat and
brought in expertise regarding decoding, modifying and adapting the probability number method to the
issue at hand.
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precaution measures, population densities and environmental factors, etc (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 1996). However, as opposed to answering questions such as the maximum
number of fatalities or effect of distance, the PNM induced risk assessment methodology was
more focused on prioritization of actions in the field of emergency preparedness.

3.4.2.2 Consequences and Probabilities
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of an accident and its respective
consequences (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). The IAEA study estimates probabilities and
consequences separately. The consequences of an accident (e.g. an event caused by storage or
transportation of certain hazardous materials) are calculated via simple numerical
manipulations, taking into consideration the characteristics of the substance and correcting
factors regarding the area, population density, accident geometry, etc. The required data to
form the components of the equation is obtained through previous modeling efforts and expert
opinions22. On the other hand, the probabilities are estimated via PNM where the probability of
a certain accident happening is calculated via a dimensionless 'probability number', N, which is
in turn transformed to actual probabilities. The probability number is adjusted/updated
according to the various correcting factors. The relationship between the probability and N is
given via N = |log 10 i 3 ]. The risk is defined as the product of the consequences and the
probabilities of unwanted outcomes (hazardous events). For the NextGen case study, the

In a similar fashion, the probability of an accident involving hazardous material storage or
transportation is calculated via utilizing the probability numbers. An average probability number
representing a base assumption for each case is determined then adjusted with correcting factors. These
factors represent various categories, from the presence of safety systems and precautions to the
operational frequency of the substance. Once the base probability number is adjusted, it can be
converted into probabilities. The probability number method was applied to industrial applications where
the sole consequence parameter is fatalities. However for the cases where multiple damages are present,
methods can be used to aggregate various consequence factors. Refer to Appendix B - Probability
Number Method (APPENDIX B - RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT MOD) for further information.

46

adequate interpretation and calculation steps were adopted and integrated which generates the
risk simulation mechanism (see Section 4.3 for further information).

3.4.2.3 Estimation of the Societal Risks
The previous section provided calculations of human casualties (fatalities) associated with
an accident, along with the probabilities of such accidents occurring. The risk to the public from
these activities is estimated by combining these two values. The consequences are categorized
with respect to the fatalities and the probability classes are categorized by the order of
magnitude of the number of accidents per year (e.g. societal risk operational instrument). The
consequence-frequency (x-y) diagram is created. The main goal is to obtain a list of activities
whose risks have to be further analyzed before others. The risk matrix representation is one of
the primary outcomes of the method.

3.5

Post Gaming (Data Analysis)

Throughout the gaming effort, the discussions and possible negotiations within the
opposing parties are important findings that can lead to different problem solving approaches.
The results of a game run are analyzed to examine if the gaming exercise influenced the beliefs,
intentions, attitudes, and behavior of participants, yielding to a better understanding of
complexity (Joldersma & Geurts, 1998). The serious gaming exercise serves both as an individual
and collective learning platform for the stakeholders, leading to an elevated level of knowledge
over the system (Wilson, et al., 2009). The individual learning takes place during the decision
making process where each stakeholder group represents its respective point of view. The
reflective conversations between the participants enable feedback and help participants build
informed judgments. Therefore, the presence of realistic interactions among players helps the
testing and evaluation of NextGen related technologies in the future (Joldersma & Geurts,

47

1998). Also, like individual learning, collective or organizational learning provides insight into the
system at hand (i.e. NextGen aviation safety values).

3.5.1

Data Collection

Besides collective and individual learning, another main contribution of the gaming
methodology is generated data. Considering the nature of predicting future states of complex
infrastructure systems, fusing simulation mechanisms with the soft gaming method creates the
best possible venue for expert elicitation for cases when the game is played with real
stakeholder and subject matter experts. In order to collect, sort, and visualize the data, an
intuitive but comprehensive mechanism was developed for this methodology which will be
discussed in Section 5.2. Since the validity of the extracted data cannot be revealed until the
future states of the system are attained, the sole way of doing so is to check the internal validity
of the generated methodology again by using expert opinions.

3.5.2

Expert Feedback

Expert feedback is a main contributor in all phases of the methodology. Experts from all
stakeholder groups help shape possible scenarios, provide numerical data regarding the future
technological enablers and also assist in evaluating the developed methodology in different
categories. Expert participation in all three phases of the gaming-based elicitation methodology
is prominent since it allows game developers to constantly modify the gaming components by
taking participant comments and recommendations into consideration. Due to the large level of
the system, no one expert is sufficient for gathering all the data needed to develop gaming
based on the given methodology. For that reason the methodology, provides a common
elicitation aggregation opportunity for next generation infrastructure development. The

48

validation section further iterates the expert feedback embedded in the validation
questionnaire given in Appendix C.

3.6

Methodology Integration

The sections covered within this chapter (pre-gaming, gaming, and post-gaming) constitute
the use of several models (RRAM, PNM), methods (serious gaming, expert elicitation), COTS
solutions (LDW, TopRank®), and data sources. It is crucial to seek seamless integration between
the components of this methodology in order to create an efficient representation of the
reference system. Besides the methodology components, the adequate capturing of the
characteristics of the system (e.g. motivation for change, constraints, system context, as well as
the societal, technical, and economic aspects.) carries vital importance for the validity of the
generated data. Because system characteristics vary with the context, the steps the modeler
needs to take change from problem to problem. For this reason, the adaptation of this
methodology to other infrastructure system transitions most likely requires modifying the
contents of the tools and approaches, yet it is important to develop a thorough balance in the
methodology integration to capture both societal and technical aspects of large infrastructure
transition problems.

3.7

Validation

The early adopters of gaming were quite skeptical of its abilities to test strategies or
forecast developments with confidence. They concluded the major benefit of the game was to
suggest research priorities and identify major problems related to policy and action
requirements (Mayer, 2009). The main criticism of the field was caused by gaming's eclectic,
diverse and interdisciplinary nature along with the lack of defining terms and concepts (Gosen &
Washbush, 2004). However, the failure to implement sustainable infrastructure models
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indicated that the multi-dimensional complexity of modern systems required different
approaches and design principles (Roos, et al., 2004). As an alternative answer, research studies
employing gaming methods increased exponentially after the 1970s (Duke, 1974) 23 .
The literature review demonstrated three relevant validation definitions regarding the
contents of this research. Peters et al. (1998) review the concept of validity under four criteria,
as suggested by Raser (1969): psychological reality, structural validity, process validity, and
predictive validity. Greenblat (1975) describes the types of validity related to gaming models
with common sense or face validity, empirical validity, and theoretical validity. Chytka (2003)
provides a validation triad containing performance, structural and content validities to validate
her methodology. The common traits of these validation approaches are given in Table 3-2.
Embarking from the definitions of Greenblat (1975) and Peters et al. (1998), face validity or
psychological reality refer t o the realistic gaming environment experienced by the participants.
For a game to be valid, the environment must portray similar characteristics to the reference
system. The empirical validity given by Greenblat designates the closeness of the game structure
to the reference system. The definition given by Peters et al. separate the empirical validity into

Although one can come across a vast amount of literature regarding the validity of experimental
situations (internal and external validity), measurement instruments (content and construct validity), and
the specific research method or its results, the concept of validity regarding simulation games is barely
elaborated in the literature (Peters, Vissers, & Heijne, 1998). The validity of gaming usage was mostly
investigated regarding its ability to enhance education and training. Researchers studied the specific
gaming attributes that contribute to learning outcomes and evaluation of gaming methods training
effectiveness (Feinstein & Cannon, 2002; Gosen & Washbush, 2004; Wilson, et al., 2009). Simulation
approach received several criticisms regarding its ability to serve as an educational tool where the main
concerns focused on internal and external validities. For the cases where the changes on the classroom
environment or generalizability of the learning effects to outside classroom situations were problematic
(Gosen & Washbush, 2004). Very generally, the validity within the simulation games can be given as the
correspondence between the model and the system itself (or the reference system). However, this
definition is not very accurate since the level of correspondence between the model and the referent
system is unknown; it could mean that the model has to one-to-one representation of the complex
system or only few components of the system are modeled. Additional criteria are necessary to
distinguish the level of association between the model and the system being modeled (Peters, et al.,
1998). The conclusions reached via a simulation game should be similar to those that can be experienced
in the real-world system (Feinstein & Cannon, 2002).
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two sections: structural validity (covering the game structure, theory and assumptions) and
process validity (concerning the information/resource flows, actor interactions, negotiations,
etc.). For the simulation to be valid, all the elements of the game (actors, information, data,
laws, norms, etc.) should be isomorphic, meaning the elements and relations do not necessarily
have to be identical but should be able to demonstrate congruency between them. Finally, the
last element covered by both definitions is related to the theoretical validity: the models' ability
to reproduce historical outcomes or predict the future, and conform to existing logical
principles.

Table 3-2 Validation Parameters

Greenblat (1975a)
Common Sense
(Face validity)
Empirical Validity
Theoretical Validity

Peters et al. (1998)

Chytka (2003) - Validation Triad

Psychological Reality

Performance Validity

Structural Validity

Structural Validity

Process Validity
Predictive Validity

Chytka (2003) developed a validation triad

Content Validity

(based on the validation square cited in

(Pedersen, Emblemsvag, Ellen, & Mistree, 2000)) in order to assess the aggregation
methodology which was developed within her dissertation. The aggregation methodology
provided risk analysis in an aerospace conceptual vehicle design that relies heavily on subjective
expert judgment which is hard to validate. Although in a different context, Chytka's validation

24

The validation triad consists of three components, namely, performance, structural and content
validities. These components are elaborated within an unstructured interview process to obtain the
validity of the methodology. The performance validity includes the efficiency of the methodology and the
usefulness of the uncertainty representation. The structural validity is concerned with the usability and
added value of the methodology and its applicability beyond the test case. Finally, the content validity is
involved with the appropriateness of the aggregation method chosen for the study
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approach was found to be relevant to the research at hand since both involve complex systems
lacking an adequate quantitative validation possibility.
The current research methodology relies heavily on subjective assessments obtained from
experts at all levels (pre-gaming, gaming, and post-gaming phases). Subsequently, the
validation parameters of the methodology require subject matter expert opinions. Validation of
the research in this dissertation depends on subjective methods where there is no predictable,
stable and data rich environment. Consequently, the outcomes of the methodology cannot be
put to test (i.e. 2025 NAS safety values). The validation of the proposed methodology was
obtained via a developed validation questionnaire which was based upon the previous works
cited within this section. This questionnaire was supplied to the participants along with the
preliminary game results in order to receive validation feedback. Appendix C includes the
validation questionnaire.

3.8

Human Subjects Research Requirements

The described methodology involved subject matter expert participation during the
development and execution phases. Additionally, the earlier phases of the study were funded by
federal support which implied the review of the research by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
before any data collection in order to protect the rights and well-being of human research
subjects.25,26 Appendix D provides the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval of informed
consent document and use of photo/video materials for data extraction and analysis (ODU IRB

10-157).
The IRB examines the research to ensure compliance with Code of Federal Regulations Title 45
Part 46 (45CFR46) and State Legislation (Virginia Code 32.1-163.16). IRB requires detailed definitions of
the research scope, project design considerations, experimental procedures, questions and briefings
presented to participants and contents of the informed consent document. The informed consent
document provides information regarding the study, compensations, benefits, and potential risks along
with precautions taken to mitigate them. The IRB requires training of researchers and responsible
primary investigators (RPIs) on Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule
26
http://www.odu.edu/ao/research/compliance/humans.shtml
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CHAPTER 4

PROBLEM DOMAIN: NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
SAFETY

NextGen implementation efforts have been used as the problem domain to demonstrate
the developed methodology in Chapter 3. This chapter will discuss how NextGen was adapted to
the methodology. A brief introduction to NextGen is then followed by sections on gaming cycle
overview, data requirements, assumptions, game rules, stakeholders, and scenarios.

4.1

NextGen Overview

The United States' National Airspace System (NAS) is a vast, multi-layered array of
operations covering virtually everything involving air transportation. With well over 800 million
passengers, NAS requires input from more than 15,000 air traffic controllers to assist 590,000
pilots on board 239,000 aircraft that take off and land at 20,000 U.S. airports. This extremely
complex system is closely tied to the national economy, contributing $1.2 trillion annually and
over 5 percent of the gross domestic product while generating 11 million jobs and $369 billion in
earnings. The air transportation industry allows the positive growth of U.S. trade balance,
enables just-in-time business models, serves businesses and helps bring friends and family
closer (FAA, 2009).
Within recent years, delays have heavily impacted passenger travel, and they are
forecasted to be even higher in the future as the demand for air transportation is expected to
increase. In addition, future airspace is expected to accommodate unmanned aircraft systems
and commercial space vehicles as well. Furthermore, the entire system is expected to operate
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within acceptable safety levels and environmental impact guidelines (FAA, 2009; U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2010a).

4.1.1

NextGen Benefits

The goal of NextGen is to make air transportation safer and more reliable while improving
the capacity of the NAS and reducing the impact of aviation on the environment. So far, the FAA
was able to deliver some of the projected advantages of newer technologies like Automatic
Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). The advantage of using ADS-B over legacy airspace
surveillance is most visible over areas like the Gulf of Mexico where radar coverage is not
adequate. One other benefit of NextGen technologies is related to improved access to runways
during low visibility due to weather or geographical obstacles. The Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS), along with other satellite-based technologies, improved runway access for both
large and small airports (FAA, 2010).
Improvements to ground safety and operations are also becoming more visible, reducing
delays around the NAS, as reported in the NextGen Implementation Plan 2010 (FAA, 2010).
Aircraft in airports in New York, Philadelphia and Texas are enjoying runway access capabilities
without crossing other close-by runways. Besides improved access, runway safety and airport
efficiency is also increased via tools like Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X (ASDEX) which enabled a 50% drop on runway incursions in 2009 (FAA, 2009, 2010).
Airspace access and safety will be re-shaped within the NextGen framework, allowing more
direct routes, time and fuel-saving procedures, and more efficient use of the available airspace
throughout NAS. The Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures, along with Optimized
Profile Descents at various airports, demonstrated significant fuel reduction, shorter flight times
and lower environmental impact with savings up to 25 gallons of fuel per landing in addition to
the 60 to 90 gallons of fuel savings when using the Tailored Arrivals (TA) which enable pilots
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optimal profiles from the high altitude space down to the runway level (FAA, 2010). The
projected NAS will be able to achieve the next level of safety for the flying public while advanced
airframe technologies, sustainable alternative fuels and new procedures will shrink aviation's
environmental footprint to overtime (FAA, 2010).

4.1.2

NextGen Challenges

The complex nature of the NAS, combined with numerous operational and management
challenges, threatens NextGen efforts. NextGen is expected to yield significant benefits in terms
of reducing delays, saving fuel, enhancing safety and so on; however, these ambitious goals also
pose a great source of risk with billion dollar investments from both the government and the
airline industry. The NextGen Implementation plan requires the co-operation of the FAA with
several partnerships and stakeholders such as airline companies, airports and manufacturers
(FAA, 2010). However, reports from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reveal that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is facing difficulties in developing a strategy to engage
stakeholders, not to mention managing and integrating multiple NextGen efforts (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2010b). Also, challenges like multi-dimensional research and
development along with complex software development, workforce changes, mixed equipage,
and policy issues need addressing. Uncertainties and the lack of historical data related to
shaping a future aviation system also inhibit the ability to use formal risk analysis methods and
other vital knowledge needed by decision makers.
There are a number of challenges that need to be tackled to achieve the increased
capabilities described within the NextGen goals. Increasing system capacity while maintaining
efficiency, increasing safety and still maintaining an economically viable industry is a must.
The mixed equipage issue reveals during the transition process where the implementation
of new technologies conflict with the existing installed counterparts. The variable maturity time
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of interdependent projects poses challenges to NextGen planners (FAA, 2010). The early
adopters of newer technologies will be able to experience the benefits. However, the FAA
should still be able to accommodate the lesser equipped aircraft. Also, the cost associated with
adopting the new technology by the aircraft operators from the airlines, general aviation or
military should be presented with a solid business case since stakeholders would not be
investing in new avionics if there are no services to support them.
Even more than the associated cost, safety is a major challenge before the next generation
air transportation. The safety aspect is the primary factor behind the design, development and
approval process of new functions and capabilities in order to meet the required level of
integrity (JPDO, 2008b). The JPDO's National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP) is designed
to ensure that the safety considerations are covered within safety practices (Safety
Management Systems throughout the industry and government) and systems (safer interfaces
within human and autonomous interfaces within air and ground based systems). The NASSP also
draws attention to the coordination of international policies, technologies and procedures to
create a seamless level of safety across air transportation systems (JPDO, 2008a).

4.2

Gaming Cycle Overview

The gaming section of the methodology developed within this research is based on a
platform adopted from a policy gaming play sequence from Geurts, Duke and Vermeulen (2007).
An adapted version of the play sequence is employed to accommodate the NextGen safety
framework (see Figure 4.1). The gaming sequence is supported by the simulation mechanism
and COTS software described in the previous chapter. The sequence is initiated by the
presentation of the game to the stakeholders including the game rules, general idea about
NextGen goals and available resources. Different stakeholder groups comprised of participants
from various backgrounds are formed, and their respective goals in the game are provided (e.g.
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the FAA concerned with safety, commercial airlines with economic feasibility, etc.). The groups
are asked to evaluate and select from the list of technological advancements related to safety
enhancements. However, implementation of each intervention requires using limited resources.
Additionally, the airlines and the government have to agree on some of the decisions due to
their conflicting agendas. Following the discussions among participants, the next year's strategic
decisions are inputted into the risk simulation mechanism (based upon the RRAM) and updated
NAS risk values which constitutes the initial conditions for the next cycle. The simulation
mechanism will also update the consequences respective to the simulated timeframe. The game
is iterated until the desired year is reached (2025). The gaming simulation concludes with
debriefing and discussions in order to create the foundation for data gathering and analysis.

Ehif-.
Scenario Presentation; National Airspace System in 2025
-NextSen 6oals, Resources, and Game Rules are provided

r
Process (<E> Time = I)
Step l . Updated environmental variables are presented
Step 2. Stakeholder group meetings-develop new strategies
Steps. Discussions and interactions among stakeholder groups

step 4. ammmv*0$m$0mm.
i\
The Risk Simulation Mechanism
\
Inputs: Decision, t, correcting factors
Updated Probabilities
Updated Consequences
Updated Risk Matrix
O u ^ » u t s ! f | K t e t « < ^ i f e k , eprtr«W|e*ilaJ

-Accepted Risk Levels
-Strategic Behavior

Figure 4-1 NextGen Safety Risk Assessment Gaming Sequence

57

4.3

Adaptation of RRAM to NextGen

The RRAM including the PNM is chosen as the backbone for the developed methodology's
risk estimation engine due to its intuitive structure and ease of expandability. The three main
components of the RRAM approach -consequences, probabilities and societal risks- are
transferred to the NextGen Safety Assessment Methodology and fused with the policy gaming
efforts provided above to develop the intuitive NextGen Safety Assessment methodology. The
following sections will highlight the adaption and assumptions made during this transformation.

4.3.1

Consequences

The consequences (the x-axis of the risk matrix, see Figure 4-4) in the IAEA study were
determined as fatalities per accident, which is a function of the affected area, population
density and the presence of mitigation measures. In a similar way, the consequences within the
NextGen safety assessment methodology were based on fatalities, considering that the ultimate
goal of NextGen related safety efforts within JPDO is concerned with saving human lives. The
consequences are estimated as a product of various components comprised of:
•

the baseline fatality rate of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 121 aviation
(NTSB, 2010),

•

the air traffic density rate (function of t), and

•

the presence of the correcting factors regarding the survivability rate in accident
scenarios.

The crash survivability correcting factors (i.e. fire/smoke mitigation, survivability of aircraft
structures, and accident response procedures) are adopted from the National Science and
Technology Council and are provided in Table 4-1. The formula is developed to estimate
accident fatalities per 100,000 flight hours.
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C = F, ,. xSxn
i

where:

Q

baseline

i

. , ,.
survival rate,i

Consequences at time, t

F

Average Fatality Rate for FAR Part 121

baseline

NAS Air traffic density at time, r

nsurvival

Correcting factors on crash survivability rate (Table 4-1)

rate,i

Table 4-1 Crash Survivability Correcting Factors (National Science and Technology Council, 2010)

Crash
Survivability
Correcting
Factors

No Presence of
Correcting
Factors

Nsurvival_rate

Initial Value : 1.0

4.3.2

1:
Enhanced Postimpact
fire/smoke
mitigation
(-15%)
0.85

1+2:
Improved crash
survivability of
aircraft
structures
(-15%)
0.70

1+2+3:
Improved
evacuation and
accident
response
procedures
(-15%)
0.55

Probabilities

The y-axis of the risk matrix consists of the probabilities associated with the accident
scenarios, resulting in the consequences described above. The probability number method does
not calculate the probability as a frequency (e.g. x/100,000FH); this is done in two steps where
first the probability number is constructed and then transformed into probability frequencies.
Since the methodology is designed to evaluate the future NAS safety related technological
developments, the correcting factors are selected mainly from NextGen JPDO's Avionics
Roadmap (2008b) and subject matter experts within the Systems Analysis and Concepts
Directorate (SACD). The tools, methods, and programs covered below do not constitute an
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exhaustive list; however, efforts from both NASA and FAA guided programs are covered. Based
on the references above, the formula to calculate the probability number, N„ is developed.

N,=N*,

+nrs + nasr + nmng + nac + nWxa + nwva

where:
N

Calculated probability number for the system at time = t

N *,
nrs

The average probability number for the current NAS setup
Correction parameter related to runway safety and collision

avoidance
nmr

Correction parameter for aircraft systems reliability technologies

n

Correction parameter for icing mitigation technologies

n

Correction parameter for airborne collision avoidance

n^

Correction parameter for weather avoidance precautions

nturb

Correction parameter for turbulence (wake) avoidance solutions

The calculated probability number Nf will be updated at each time frame and be used as
the initial average probability number N*t

for each system. The respective correcting factor

tables for the categories will be provided next.

4.3.3

Categories and Enabler Selection

The categories provided above were selected based on the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) aviation accident statistics covering years 1996 - 2007 and potential accident
areas in the future with the introduction of increased traffic within the FAA Part 121 Commercial Air Carrier Category. The aviation occurrence categories defined by the Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) were also
employed to facilitate the data gathering process (CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team, 2008).
The enablers for each of the categories above obtained from various programs within NASA's
Aviation Safety (NASA, 2010) and from FAA FY2011 Budget Estimates (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2010a). Information on cost, operational timeline and content were taken from
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the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and other publications (FAA, 2010; JPDO,
2008a, 2008b; NASA, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The categories and the respective
technologies/methods provided below are limited to safety related areas. The technologies
associated with increased capacity or reduced environmental impact goals are not within the
scope of this research. Appendix E provides detailed information on the enabler categories,
definitions, associated costs, timeline and benefits.
Within the gaming cycle, the selection of the enablers is done by the participants of the
relevant stakeholder groups. Participants decide on the timeline and collaborations regarding
the adoption of the predetermined enablers under several categories. Participants are asked to
evaluate enabler benefits, costs, mixed equipage risk and implementation timeline, then review
their budget and plan for the near future in order to make the decision about when to
"purchase" the enablers and how to construct collaborations whenever it is possible. During this
process, the Logical Decisions for Windows® (LDW) software is employed to assist the
participants (namely airlines and airport authorities) in examining each alternative at any timestep. Using LDW's "Dynamic Sensitivity" option under the Results tab, participants change the
utility function parameters to determine the ranking within the enablers. The adjusted weight
for each measure (i.e. benefit, cost, implementation timeline, and mixed equipage risk) rearranges the ranking of the alternatives, providing the participants with the prioritized list of
enablers to purchase. Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 provide snapshots for enabler rankings for
airport and airline stakeholders, respectively.

61

^

^--W5 foi* We £n*i>!*M '>0»i
- Mixed Equipage Risk

t & Gush - f e ^ t i ^ y fot Rani S^e tr a&ht J >SOT

p*4fc|w«f.W3

Ranking for Rank the Enablers Goal
Alternative Utility
T2
Cl
Rl
R2
C2

0.603
0.544
0.534
0.466
0.193

• Cost
O liriplementahon Time

I Mixed Equipage Risk

Preference Set = Sensitivity
Drag bar end or cHck on weight to adjust
Member
Cost
Benefit
Implementation Time
Mixed Eqiopage Risk

Weight
36.2
25.0
16 4
22.4
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Figure 4-3 Airlines Enablers LDW Snapshot
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4.3.3.1 Runway Safety and Collision Avoidance Category
The runway safety and collision avoidance category contains accidents that occur on the
ground. Associated CAST/ICAO definitions for this category are Ground Handling (RAMP),
Ground Collision (GCOL), Runway Incursion - Animal (Rl-A), and Runway Incursion - Vehicle,
Aircraft or Person (RI-VAP). This category is divided into 2 sub-categories: Rl - Capacity/Safety
Related Runway Enablers and R2 - Runway Visibility. Respective NextGen and other
technologies/methodologies in order to reduce accidents observed within the Rl category are:
Airport Surface Detection Equipment- Model X (ASDE-X), and Runway Incursion Reduction
Program. The R2 category includes the Runway Status Lights (RWSL), Moving Maps, Terminal
Area Hazard Sensor, and Automatic Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B) (as the key enabler
technology which is the prerequisite for ASDE-X).

4.3.3.2 Aircraft Systems Reliability Category
This category contains accidents related to system component, failure or malfunction of
aircraft. It is divided into three categories, comprised of Powerplant, Structure, and Software &
Systems (A/Cl, A/C2, A/C3). NextGen technologies and mitigation measures for A/Cl category
are: Propulsion Health Management System, Aircraft Catastrophic Failure Research; for A/C2
category: Airframe Health Management System, Continued Airworthiness for Airframe
Structures; and for A/C3 category: Software Health Management System and Aircraft Systems
Health Management System.

4.3.3.3 Icing Mitigation Category
Although icing is not considered a safety hazard within the current air transportation
infrastructure (with less than 1% of accidents occurring within the timeframe), this category is
included in the framework since the increased NextGen capacity eventually will require flying in
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potentially icy flight envelopes. The icing mitigation category is divided up to two subcategories; icing occurring on aircraft structures (i.e. aerodynamics and control surfaces) and
engine icing, I I and 12, respectively. Future technologies/methodologies aiming to mitigate icing
in category I I are Iced Airframe Aerodynamics Modeling and Prediction Methods, Icing Remote
Sensing, and Atmospheric Hazards - Icing. Icing category 12 enablers are External HazardsIcing, Engine Icing Modeling, Advanced Sensors and Materials.

4.3.3.4 Airborne Collision Avoidance Category
The airborne collision avoidance category is related to mid-air collisions (MAC), near mid-air
collisions (NMAC), TCAS alerts, loss of separation and potential loss of separation occurrences.
Similar to icing accidents, within the timeframe there hasn't been a mid-air collision. Also, the
near-mid air collisions and loss of separation incidents are around 1% of total accidents. Given
the assumption that future aviation will have a higher level of NMAC, MAC and Loss of
Separation due to increased capacity, these values are taken from the incident database for the
same period of time. The airborne collision avoidance category is divided into two main
categories, NMAC (CI) and Loss of Separation (C2). The technologies to mitigate risk of mid-air
collision are enhancements to TCAS for category CI. Category C2 enhancements are Loss of
Separation Assurance and Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) for Global Positioning
System (GPS). The Loss of Separation Assurance technology requires ADS-B technology to be
acquired.

4.3.3.5 Weather (Thunderstorm) Avoidance Category
The weather avoidance category is comprised of accidents related to the presence of
thunderstorm or lightning (WSTRW) as the primary cause and the controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) due to low visibility. The two categories within the Weather related accidents are

64

Thunderstorm (Wl) and Visibility (W2). One of the anticipated technologies to prevent weather
related accidents for the W l category is Integrated Weather in the Cockpit enabler which
requires Data Link enhancements to be in place. Accidents related to weather related visibility
will be improved by the integration of Synthetic Vision to the aircraft fleet.

4.3.3.6 Turbulence Avoidance Category
The final category is turbulence (wake) avoidance. According to collected data, the wake
turbulence is the primary cause for aircraft accidents. The category is split into two subcategories: in flight turbulence encounter, (Category Tl) and ground wake vortices (Category
T2). The Forward Looking Interferometer, Aircraft Wake Database, Wake and Wind Based
Procedures are methods and technologies under development to mitigate turbulence in flight
(Tl). Wake Turbulence Mitigation for Arrivals and Departures will be implemented for Category
T2 type accidents.

4.3.4

Probability, Severity Definitions, and Risk Matrix Thresholds

The risk matrix and respected definitions that are used within the methodology are
adopted from the FAA's Safety Management System Manual (FAA, 2008). This graphical means
of determining risk levels is chosen since the methodology aims to calculate the likelihood
(probability) and the severity (consequences) for each risk independently where the risk is the
product of these two (Figure 4-4). The 'traffic light' approach (or ALARA principle) is taken
where the red areas demonstrate the unacceptable risk areas, caused by an event carrying
catastrophic consequences, major consequences with a high likelihood value. The yellow and
green areas signify the medium and low risk levels, respectively. The definitions of the x and yaxis are given within the following tables (Table 4-2 and Table 4-3) in the context of NextGen
safety assessment methodology.
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Figure 4-4 Risk Matrix Adapted from FAA (FAA, 2008)

The severity levels are defined based upon the FAA risk definitions, on the five-point Likert
scale, ranging from minimal to catastrophic. The historical average of 0.291 fatalities per
100,000 flight hours is taken from the NTSB website (2000-2009) and is assumed to be a minor
risk that the aviation industry inherently carries. The consequences axis on the matrix
demonstration will have the two extremes on the x-axis.
Since there have been years without any fatalities within the FAR Part 121, the lower-end
of the axis is assigned as '0'. The upper end of the scale is the worst-case scenario where there
are no crash survivability efforts in 2025 where the NAS air traffic density is 2.5 times the
current density. Within this setup, the threshold value for catastrophic consequences will be:
C2025= 0.291x2.5x1 = 0.727.(Table 4-2).
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Table 4-2 Consequences Definitions

Consequences

? (tip* ;

Minor

w

Hazardous

*

*

Catastrophic

3^

Fatalities /
100.000FH

0

0.291

0.436

0.582

0.727

Normalized

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

Similarly, the probability axis values are given in Table 4-3 where the probability ranges
from frequent to extremely improbable. Since the methodology is focused on estimating the
overall NAS accidents causing fatalities, the FAA's quantitative probability definition for NAS
systems and ATC Operational definitions are adopted. Also, the corresponding probability
numbers are calculated and given in the table. The baseline accident rates (0.208/100,000FH for
2000-2009) indicate an initial average of N: 5.681 (Remote) before any NextGen related
technology implementation is p r e s e n t ^

intersection of severity 4 and likelihood C.

0 208/

,

/ooooo

= 5 681 . This results in a 'Low Risk' area, the
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Table 4-3 Probability Definitions

Probability 4,

Frequent

Remote

Extremely
^ " Remote
0 ^
Extremely
Improbable
E

4.4

NAS Systems &ATC
Operational
(Quantitative)
Probability of occurrence per
operation/operation al hour
is equal to or greater than
1x10 5

„ . ....
Probab.hty of
Occurrence
„

.„ 3

Probability
Number
N
N<3

Probability of occurrence per
operation/operation al hour , . „ ,
.«,„,.
7
....„,.
. 1x10" > p > 1x10*
L
is less than 1x10-3, but equal
?
to or greater than 1x10

3<N<5

Probability of occurrence per
operation/operation al hour
is less than or equal to 1x10 5 1x10 5 > pi
but equal to or greater than
1x10 7

1x10 7

5<NS7

Probability of occurrence per
operation/operation al hour
is less than or equal to 1x10 7
; but equal to or greater than
1x10'

1x10 7 > p £ IxlO" 9

7<N£9

Probability of occurrence per
operation/operational hour
is less than 1x10 9

p< 1x10"'

N>9

Data Requirements

In order to support the decision making process, various data sources have been used
throughout the methodology. Due to the nature of the problem at hand, a combination of
numerical and elicited data has been used in various sections. Historical data concerning the
current aviation accident rates and fatalities for FAA Part 121 are taken from NTSB general
aviation statistics (NTSB, 2010) and the Aviation Accident and Incident Data System. This
database was obtained from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)
department of the FAA's Office of Aviation Safety in April 200927. Within the database, the most
current detailed categorization of aviation accident and incident data was up to 2006; however

27

Data gathered by Joni Evans at NASA Langley Research Center, May 25th, 2010
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the NTSB website contained accident values up to year 2009. In both cases, for the average
calculation, the past 10 years were taken into consideration. Appendix F outlines the data
obtained from the NTSB website and Aviation Accident and Incident Data System.
The serious gaming exercise also required intense SME participation due to lack of data
regarding future NAS systems. For most cases, the benefits of future enablers were solely based
on SME opinions. In order to acquire such data, a meeting with experts from NASA Langley
Research Center was held, and opinions were gathered in an informal brainstorming session,
and a single point value for each enabler was collected.
Besides the incident/accident related data, current airline and airport financial data are also
extracted in order to create a realistic baseline for the gaming activity. For that purpose, the
eight largest airports and airline companies are selected, and their financial data are taken as
baseline. The airports are selected according to the passenger enplanement in 2009. The hub
airports and the financial data are obtained from the FAA Compliance Activity Tracking System
(CATS) - Summary Report 127,28 and the summary is given in Table 4-4. The non-operating
revenues and expenses such as interest income, grant receipts and capital expenditures and
debts are excluded from the source data.

http://cats.airports.faa.gov/Reports/reports.cfm
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Table 4-4 Hub Airports Financial Data

Aeronautical

Non-Aeronautical

Revenue

Revenue

$128,393,480

Total Revenue

Total Expenses

Operating Income

$261,141,707

$389,535,187

$328,696,000

$60,839,187

$394,628,018

$229,815,711

$624,443,729

$583,001,760

$41,441,969

$356,447,720

$322,803,300

$679,251,020

$609,838,347

$69,412,673

$214,715,984

$292,003,726

$506,719,710

$565,598,324

-$58,878,614

$316,559,851

$247,930,260

$564,490,111

$557,099,885

$7,390,226

$572,065,153

$399,901,016

$971,966,169

$824,406,256

$147,559,913

Intercontinental - * • $406,284,635

$134,861,967

$541,146,602

$301,177,105

$239,969,497

$162,030,250

$195,450,927

$357,481,177

$317,131,107

$40,350,070

$318,890,636

$260,488,577

$579,379,213

$510,868,598

$68,510,615

Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta Int'l (ATI)
£Mcag»0ilMM Intl

Los Angeles Int'l (tAX)

Dallas fotftftterthMI

M i M M

- 6eorg#iu#r'J*
Houston (IAH)
Las Vegas-McCarran
Int'l (LAS)

Average

*

Similarly, the airline companies with the highest annual operating revenue are selected and
their financial information was obtained from the Research and Innovative Technology
Administration (RITA) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) website29. Two separate
databases are employed in order to obtain various airline data such as transport revenues (Air
Carrier Financial - Schedule P-1.2)30 and (Air Carrier Financial Schedule P.12)31 fuel consumption.
Schedule P-1.2 database allowed extracting airline specific passenger baggage fees,

' http://www.transtats.bts.eov/databases.asp7Mode ID=l&Mode Desc=Aviation&Subject ID2=0
1
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp7Table ID=295
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp7Table ID=294

transportation fees, reservation cancellation fees and other incomes along with expenses like
maintenance, flying operation and maintenance. The schedule P.12 database provided airline
specific fuel cost and fuel consumption, leading to average fuel prices for the past 5 years. An
overview of the largest air carriers and their financial information is given in Table 4-5. The
airlines considered within the simulation are Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines,
U.S. Airways, Northwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Continental Airlines, American, Alaska and
Airtran Airways. Due to the high volatility in corporate airline finances, non-operating income
and expenses including capital gains and losses and interest expenses are excluded from the
financial data.

Table 4-5 Airlines Financial Data

Year

Passengers
Enplanement

Transport
Revenues
(Passengers)

Passenger
Baggage Fees

Reservation
Cancellation
Fees

mm

435,872,373

$76,625395,190

$2,483,375320

$2,272,477,940 $107,294,780,070 $107,509,895,540

2008

466,135,262

$93,255,623,070

$1,106,215,550

$1,555,489,830 $126,681,047,070 $132,680,337,010 -$5,999,290,950

ma

474,271,862

$87,784^44310

$444,702,430

$831,832,450

$116,362,119,010 $110,190,954,900 $6,171,164,090

459,673,190

$81,768,216,120

$415,063,060

$824,749,660

$108,841,373,850 $104,771,978,500 $4,069,395,350

isoi"

460,774,685

$74,428,508,670

$315,147^30

$780,113,770

$97,862,669,110 $99,966,347,780 -$2,103,678,670

Average

4S9,34S,474

$82,772,637,572

$952,900,838

Total Operating Total Operating Operating Profit
Expenses
orLoss
Revenues

$1,252,932,730 $111,408,397,822 $111,023,902,746

-$215,115,440

$384,494,876

The ten largest corporate airlines are represented as a single entity for purposes of
simplicity. On average, between the years 2005 and 2009, the depicted airlines made up 70% of
enplanements in the domestic market. At the time of developing the methodology, 2010 values
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were not complete. Table 4-6 outlines the specific enplanements for the major airlines and their
ratio with respect to the total NAS passenger capacity. The data was obtained from the T-100
Domestic Market (U.S. Carriers)32 which can be found on the BTS website. The financial data for
the airline companies are handled collectively, and their five year averages (2005 - 2009) are
adopted as the initial conditions for the gaming exercise.

Table 4-6 Major U.S. Airlines Enplanements

Airline Cofporat tons
4 "

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

AirTran Airways
Corporation

16,520,043

19,967,895

23,716,544

24,586,032

23,821,768

Alaska Airlines Inc.

14,603,547

14,916,122

15,328,828

14,864,602

14,060,609

Awert^Alrtfaes-tae;

77,296,967

76,813,449

76,581,414

71,563,663

66,168,794

Continental Air tines Inc.

32,971,219

35,795,440

37,117,030

34,524,968

31,954,535

Delta Air Unes Inc.

77,381,274

63,495,883

61,599,411

59,375,572

55,708,779

JetBlue Airways

14,462,932

18,098,021

20,527,593

20,517,934

20,022,359

Southwest Airlines Co.

88,435,832

96,330,250

101,947,800

101,965,552

101,374,390

^^tMtmm^i

55,172,705

57,229,074

56,420,151

51,681,045

45,582,670

37,040,080

31,886,350

37,220,911

48,544,910

44,554,186

46,690,086

45,140,701

43,812,180

38,510,984

32,624,283

460,774,685

459,673,190

474,271,862

466,135,262

435,872,373

660,614,523

660,642,163

681,492,975

653,816,163

620,201,000

69.75%

69.58%

69.59%

71.29%

70.28%

x

.

•

US Airways Inc.

"i

Northwest
S^teitAM^es^

f:

Total MAS Enplanements ;
Ratte of Select Airlines to
TrAjl asotarwrpent*-

http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp7Table ID=258
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4.5

Assumptions

The risk classification and prioritization methodology presented in Section 3.4.2 consists of
accidents occurring in complex industrial systems (handling, storage, and transportation of
hazardous materials like flammables, explosives and toxic gases and liquids). The approach
within the original methodology is geared towards supporting the upper risk management with
system-level risk assessment. For that reason, the probability and consequences calculations
contain a large number of assumptions, limiting the methods to be solely risk prioritization for
further analysis. The adaption of this approach to the NextGen framework also required a fair
amount of simplifications and assumptions in order to focus on the NAS level risk characteristics.
Since the timeframe for this method involves over 15 years the technologies, their implications,
benefits and costs are mainly provided by the small number of SMEs that took part in the
collaboration33,34.

4.6

Game Rules

Each serious game is a dedicated simulation gaming exercise, specifically tailored-made and
designed for the problem at hand. The actual run of the serious game is a collective and
interactive process designed by the very owners of the problem: "Through the unique
combination of simulation with role-playing, participants themselves actually create the future
that they want to study, rather than it being produced for them as in projects where formal
The probability number calculation components were collected based on the NextGen JPDO
Avionics Roadmap (JPDO, 2008b). The roadmap is constructed by drawing materials from NextGen
planning sources in order to communicate the proposed NextGen capabilities and improvements
corresponding avionics overtime. The correcting factors located in the probability number calculations are
selected upon the Safety Enhancement/Hazard Avoidance and Mitigation section in the roadmap and the
general expertise of participating experts related to NextGen safety
In calculating the consequences axis, only fatalities related to FAR Part 121 were taken into
consideration. However other consequences like accidents, serious injuries, hull losses and accident
related costs were not included since data for a 15-year long timeframe for every future scenario would
be burdensome to collect in a meaningful manner. For that reason, consequences were constructed only
with fatality data from past 10 years, projected NAS capacity increase, and planned measures to increase
survivability rate in case of crashes
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simulation models were used" (Geurts, et al., 2007, p. 536). However, unlike in many strategic
seminars, serious gaming allows participants to engage by creating and analyzing the results of
their decisions in a safe environment. At this point, the laying out of the game rules plays a very
important role. Rigid and rule-based gaming works well for well-structured environments like
military gaming. This type of gaming is based on specific rule-sets, formalized by mathematical
and/or computational methods. The rigid-type rule-sets are successful when the problem at
hand is well-defined and understood like oligopolistic market settings.
On the other hand, in social arenas with public and intense stakeholder interactions where
firm rules do not exist, free form gaming is more suitable (Mayer, 2009). Free form gaming,
initially implemented in the 1950s at the Social Science Division at RAND, is also known as
seminar gaming or political-military gaming. During game play, positions, objects and rules can
be challenged, modified, and improved by players. The game needs to be carefully monitored by
a control team, mostly experts, acting like referees or game directors. This type of gaming
requires a high level of subject matter expert input and experienced players within a carefully
crafted scenario setting. As stated previously, each game is designed specifically to serve a
purpose (solve a problem, provide insights, reach a consensus, etc.) and the gaming rules have
to be specifically tailored to this purpose.
Within the scope of this project, the primary goal is to provide insights into future NAS
safety and data gathering regarding future systems. For that reason, a combination of rigid and
free form gaming rules was employed. However, unlike a traditional policy gaming exercise, the
end state of the aviation safety within the NextGen framework is somehow determined, i.e.
cutting the aviation fatality risks by 2025 (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2010a). The goal
of the serious game is to simulate the aviation safety values within the timeframe while taking
into consideration the technological constraints (cost/benefit, feasibility, mixed equipage, etc.)
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and behavioral concerns (information overload to pilots, controllers as well as early technology
adopters). For that reason, a nominal number of stakeholder rules are determined to help guide
the stakeholder interactions (e.g. the FAA mandating Corporate Airlines or Airport Operators to
adopt certain technologies, etc.), reflecting real-world relationships. Figure 4-5 provides a basic
stakeholder rule schematic outlining the common ground rules regarding engagement rules.
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Figure 4-5 Basic Stakeholder Rules

However, in order for experts from various stakeholder groups to reveal hidden
complications caused by social factors, the bounding stakeholder rules should be kept to a
minimum. Also, due to the nature of the participants, their expertise will help game directors
modify certain rules, allowing the serious gaming model to expand and became more realistic
after each session.
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4.7

Stakeholders

One of the most productive outcomes of the policy gaming exercises is the participants'
interaction with the problem at hand. The 'safe' environment allows participants to create and
analyze the complexity by communicating various aspects of the issue among the stakeholders.
As Duke (1980) argued, real-world complex problems often include a sociopolitical context,
created by the idiosyncratic or irrational 'players' present during the decision-making process.
Stakeholder identification is crucial to managing projects involving complex technical aspects,
and it is also necessary to understand and articulate individual or collective goals along with
interaction dynamics before conducting any further research (Faulconbridge & Ryan, 2003).
Determining the relevant participants, their value demands and expectations also has to be a
part of the equation, especially considering the complexity of the system involving socioeconomic, behavioral and human dimension aspects of the problem (Brewer, 2007).
Consequently, the large-scale transformation of the NAS also harbors various stakeholders with
diverse agendas that can directly or indirectly affect the decision-making process. In order to
model such a dynamic environment, a simplified list of involved stakeholders and engagement
rules were developed. The interested parties given within Table 4-7 have primary (and often
conflicting) goals and resources that will be unfolded throughout the gaming exercise (Sherry, et
al., 2005). Each stakeholder group is represented by three experts who determine the strategy
that is followed throughout the game. Chytka (2003) argues that adding more experts within
each group will not improve efficiency and effectiveness of the data gathered.
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Table 4-7 Stakeholders list and their primary objectives

Government, FAA and Military
Objective: safety, protect and

Corporate Airlines
Objective: Market share, profit,

nurture aviation industry, throughput

throughput

Airport Operators

4.7.1

Public

Objective: throughput, revenue neutral,

Objective: Affordable and safe

safety

transportation

Government, FAA and Military Stakeholder

This stakeholder group represents the "big brother" role over the airports and airlines. The
government is responsible for determining tax values for various areas such as income,
environmental and security, along with aviation fuel tax. The players representing this
stakeholder must behave according to the scenario; however, they are encouraged to take
initiatives to promote the acquisition of certain NextGen enablers and overall NAS safety. The
FAA's role as the enforcer of aviation safety is also controlled by this stakeholder. By closely
monitoring the yearly changes at the Risk Matrix, government/FAA can intervene with airline
and airport pricing and acquisition plans. They also have the ability to spare funds for assisting
airlines and airports in purchasing large-ticket items such as ADS-B and Data Link enablers. The
final task of this stakeholder is to reflect the military agenda based on the scenario presented
(i.e. the adjustments required for UAS integration to NAS). It is desirable that this scenario is
represented by players with a background in government, the military and FAA certification
experience.
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4.7.2

Corporate Airlines

The representative group for corporate airlines determines the yearly average ticket prices,
the reservation cancellation fees and passenger baggage fees. Their finances are directly
affected by the strategies followed by other stakeholders, i.e. airports collect landing fees and
the government collects various taxes. Airlines are also affected by the predetermined scenario
mandating aircraft jet fuel before taxes or global terrorist threats. Airlines are encouraged to
engage in coalitions with other stakeholders and invest funds in NextGen enablers and
technologies because they are the primary beneficiaries of the increase in NAS capacity.
Corporate airlines are expected to reflect their expenses in passenger ticket prices and fees;
however, the general public stakeholder can react to increased ticket prices by choosing other
modes of transportation.

4.7.3

Airport Operators

The airport stakeholder represents the main hub airports in the continental U.S.. These
airports were listed in Table 4-4. Unlike airline companies, the airport's financial information
only reflects the 2009 data, and the averages of 10 airports are taken into consideration as the
baseline for the gaming exercise. In other words, the airport operator stakeholder represents
only one U.S. hub whereas the corporate airlines represent the ensemble of the eight largest
airlines in the United States. Like the airlines stakeholder, airport operators interact with other
players in determining their strategies and pricing. Airport authorities decide on aeronautical
and non-aeronautical fees. Aeronautical fees include airport landing fees that a passenger
facility charges that are billed to airline companies. Non-aeronautical fees include expenses
geared towards passengers such as parking fees, concession fees, airport shop rental fees, etc.
Airports are bound to pay income and security taxes, as determined by the government
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stakeholder. Since NextGen enablers allow airports to increase their landing capacities, players
representing the airports are inherently motivated to invest in these technologies.

4.7.4

General Public

The general public stakeholder indirectly works with the game master in order to
determine the "actual" air transportation capacity. This stakeholder reviews the information
available regarding various forms of transportation and determines if he/she agrees with the
projected air traffic capacity. The "Public Announcement Dashboard" provides updated
information on cost of travel by air, train and car on two pilot routes (Washington, DC to New
York, NY and Washington, DC to Boston, MA). At the end of each time step (i.e. simulated year),
the public stakeholder decides whether to agree or adjust the projected air transportation
capacity from -10% to 10% with 5% intervals. The general public stakeholder can reflect upon
the increased the air transportation costs that were decided by airport and airline stakeholders.
By modifying that specific year's air transportation capacity, the general public is included in
determining the air transportation capacity. The information packages available to the public
are U.S. economic competitiveness, threats to global security, transportation costs for the three
aforementioned modes, and the evolving transportation environment (introduction of high
speed rail systems and other modes). The goal in including the general public in the game is to
be able to capture the irrational stakeholder behavior that could be portrayed by the general
public.

4.8

Scenarios

The gaming exercise requires a dynamic environment to enable participants (or agents) to
interact with each other. The dynamic scenario enables game masters or decision makers to
evaluate various scenarios and extract the collective response from all the stakeholders. For
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gaming purposes, a previous study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC)
concerning scenario-based strategic planning is used as a baseline for the required scenarios
(National Research Council, 1997). The study involved a workshop performed by NRC to help
guide NASA's strategic planning processes. The workshop was organized with the help of NASA's
Office of Aeronautics, The Futures Group (TFG) and the Systems Technology Group of Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC). In addition, experts from industry, academia and
the military participated in the study to determine five long-term distinguished scenarios.
Scenarios are based on economic, social and policy issues and became the dimensions (or
attributes) of each scenario. Based upon the NRC study, the following table depicting the
scenario environment for each year is determined and tested with the gaming session that took
place on February 14th, 2011 (Table 4-8). The scenario is provided as the initial conditions for
each year's discussions; however, the final values for the base fuel price or air transportation
capacity are determined by the players.
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Table 4-8 Scenario Environment by Year

t*m

Scenario Name

Pushing the

2010

Envelope

Demand for
Aeronautics
Services

Global
Security
Threat

Government
Participation

Base Fuel
Price

Anticipated
Passenger
Capacity (%)

Strong

High Growth

Low

Low

$2,136

100%

2011

Pushing the
Envelope

Strong

High Growth

Low

Low

$2,136

120%

mi

Pushing the
Envelope

Strong

High Growth

Low

Low

$2 136

135%

2013

Pushing the
Envelope

Strong

High Growth

Low

Low

$2,136

150%

Pushing the
Envelope

Strong

High Growth

Low

Low

$2 136

165%

2015

Grounded

Strong

Low Growth

High

High

$2 136

50%

2016

Grounded

Strong

Low Growth

High

High

$2,138

60%

Jit?

Regional
Tensions

Weak

High Growth

High

High

$2,140

165%

$Ma

Regional
Tensions

Weak

High Growth

High

High

$2,140

175%

aeis

Regional
Tensions

Weak

High Growth

High

High

$2,140

185%

Regional
Tensions

Weak

High Growth

High

High

$2,140

195%

Regional
Tensions

Weak

High Growth

High

High

$2,155

205%

Weak

Low Growth

High

High

$2 155

215%

Environmentally
Challenged

Weak

Low Growth

High

High

$2,170

220%

Environmentally
Challenged

Weak

Low Growth

High

High

$2,180

225%

Environmentally
Challenged

Weak

Low Growth

High

High

$2,180

230%

MM

*'

•'

"v

-A.

Environmentally

2022

Challenged

3WI "
:

U S Economic
State

UIW.

2025

4.9

J% JJ

Gaming Sequence

As previously demonstrated in Figure 4-1, gaming takes place in a sequential manner.
Stakeholders are given time to evaluate their options by simulating their finances for each timestep. At the end of the short decision making period, the strategies (fees, enabler acquisition
and other variables) are revealed in order. Each stakeholder group possesses an Excel
spreadsheet enabling it to calculate its budget variables (airline ticket fees, landing fees, etc.)
and is required to spare funds for the upcoming NextGen related enabler expenses. On the
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other hand, since each participant group affects other's finances, a pre-determined amount of
time is allowed for groups to discuss and revise their previous assessments and strategies. The
following steps are followed during the game.
1. The game master announces the variables of the specific calendar year including
the anticipated air transportation capacity, political, economical, social
environments and the untaxed fuel price. See Table 4-8 Scenario Environment by
Year.

Figure 4-6 Snapshot from a Gaming Exercise

2. According to predictions for the following year, participants experiment with their
variables and simulate their budgets using the provided personalized Excel
spreadsheets, allowing them to determine the funds that can be used for NextGen
enablers.
3. The participants are given 5 minutes to discuss the enabler acquisition strategy and
possible coalitions, including the prerequisite enablers like ADS-B or Data Link.
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4. The round starts with the government's announcement of taxes for the coming
year, in accordance with the political and economic environment (government
participation level and U.S. economic state).
5. The participants representing airport authorities announce their landing fees and
concession fees, along with the enablers they are willing to purchase this year.
6. The airline stakeholders announce their variables: passenger ticket fees,
reservation cancellation fees, baggage fees and the planned NextGen enabler
acquisitions
7. Another 5 minutes are allowed for stakeholders to discuss their fees before they
are announced to the game master, and the risk values for the specific year are
calculated
8. Once the "new air transportation environment" is revealed, the general public
stakeholder examines the cost for various modes of transportation along with the
safety of air travel and determines the final air transportation capacity by adjusting
the previously announced anticipated capacity. Adjustments can be done from 10% to 10% change with 5% increments.
9. With the "actual" passenger capacity determined, stakeholder budgets are
adjusted, and the following year's variables are stated by the game master, and
another round is initiated beginning with step number 1.
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CHAPTER 5

DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS

5.1

Introduction

Throughout the gaming effort, discussions and possible negotiations within the opposing
parties are important findings that can lead to different constructive problem solving
approaches. The serious gaming exercise serves both as an individual and collective learning
platform for stakeholders, leading to an elevated level of knowledge of the system. Individual
learning takes place during the decision making process where each stakeholder group
represents its respective point of view. The reflective conversations between participants enable
feedback and help participants make informed judgments. Therefore, the presence of realistic
interactions among players helps testing and evaluation of NextGen related technologies in the
future (Joldersma & Geurts, 1998). Also, besides individual learning, collective learning, or
organizational learning provides insight regarding the system at hand (i.e. the NextGen aviation
safety values).
One of the most tangible outcomes of the gaming exercise is the 2025 NAS safety values
with respect to the FAA's Risk Matrix (Figure 4-4) acceptability measures. Also, the intermediate
risk values during the technology implementation phase (for the next 15 years) are also
calculated under the same assumptions. The cumulative effect of various safety related
technological implementations are examined, enabling decision makers to define technologies
or areas that require further analysis and understanding.
There are three venues of data collection throughout the serious gaming exercise. The
entire session is video recorded in order to observe discussions that took place between players.
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Also, discussions among the stakeholders regarding pricing or behavioral strategies, negotiations
and other interactions are followed by the game master and facilitators. Without disturbing the
flow of the game, questions originating from the facilitator or the game master regarding certain
decisions allow the collection of behavioral information.
The second type of data is the numerical data, originated from the decisions given by the
participants regarding NextGen enabler acquisition timeline, coalitions formed, and pricing
strategies. This allows the observation of stakeholder reactions through their pricing strategies
with respect to the changing scenario. By observing the graphics, it may be possible to single out
cause-and-effect relationships to better comprehend the complex decision making
environment.
The third and final data source comes from the debriefing and questionnaire section
following the gaming exercise. At this point, specially crafted questions are directed to the
participants in order to give them the opportunity to express themselves and provide facilitators
with the reasoning behind their decisions. Also, data regarding the validation of the
methodology is collected via questionnaires.

5.2

Data Collection Mechanism

In order to aggregate and process the data, the serious gaming platform presented within
the previous chapter is coupled with the data aggregation platform, a designated,
comprehensive Excel® file assigned to calculate and communicate the dynamic NAS Risk values
and other statistics among players, facilitators and game masters. The data aggregation
platform contains all the financial relationships, accident statistics and risk assessment model
calculations necessary to generate interim safety values and other statistics.
Figure 5-1 provides an overview of the data elicitation mechanism developed within the
current research methodology. The serious gaming platform promotes a challenging and
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engaging environment for discussion and decision making. The discussions and strategic
behaviors, along with decisions like pricing, taxation, or enabler acquisitions are followed by
game facilitators and recorded on video for further analysis.
Similar to the qualitative data, quantitative data are also collected and recorded via the
Excel spreadsheet operated by the game master. The file contains numerous sections including
stakeholder tabs (called dashboards), a risk calculation (PNM) tab, a technological enablers tab,
and the accident database. Each tab is connected to the others; e.g. aircraft landing fees
charged by airports are shown as an expense on the corporate airline dashboard, enabler
acquisitions provide increased on safety levels on the Risk Matrix tab, etc. The developed
database stemmed from system variables (NAS capacity, risk, taxation values, budgets,
participation, etc.) enables the regeneration of the graphics given within this section.
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5.3

Sample Data and Generic Scenarios

As previously stated, transactions between players allow numerical data gathering
regarding the various variables in the game. Although the participants are bounded to the limits
of certain predetermined scenario guidelines, the numerical value for the variables is completely
determined throughout the game. For instance, the government stakeholder determines the
income, environmental, security and fuel taxes but he/she will only apply, raise or lower these
values according to the scenario. That way, it is possible to observe the effects of the scenario
among the players. The scenario-sets stated in Table 4-8 are for demonstration purposes only,
and they provide a baseline for testing the developed methodology.

5.3.1

"Pushing the Envelope"

One of the most tangible outcomes of the gaming exercise is the simulated NAS safety
values for the 15-year time interval from 2010 to 2025. As previously demonstrated, the
severity and the likelihood values for the risk construct originate from the PNM approach using
the initial conditions obtained from historical data. The modified risk matrix in Figure 5-2 shows
the evolution of NAS safety with time. Based upon the assumptions, the 2010 safety level is
described with remote accident likelihood and minimal severity. Starting from year 2010, the
anticipated air transportation capacity increase takes the accident likelihood towards
"probable" where accident severity is also seen with "minor" consequences. This scenario is
called "Pushing the Envelope," and the situation reflects the steep increase anticipated by FAA's
2010 Fiscal year. This scenario depicts a continuously growing strong economy and a liberal
trade policy environment, allowing stakeholders to regulate the market. During this scenario,
stakeholders are required to invest in transportation infrastructure components like ADS-B
initiation, Data Link setup and many other enablers to accommodate the anticipated increase in
air travel. As expected, several NextGen safety related technologies and management strategies
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are initiated by stakeholders; however, their benefits don't surface immediately. For that
reason, the NAS safety value migrates towards the upper-left corner of the grid.

5.3.2

"Grounded"
In years 2015 and 2016, the air transportation capacity is largely hampered by a scenario-

driven series of terrorist attacks. This scenario was generated by the NRC study from 1997,
somehow portraying the September 2011 events. Within the NRC study, terrorist attacks are
caused by large gap between the income levels and living standard of developed nations
compared to second or third world countries. The scenario for these two years is called
"Grounded" where air travel is no longer safe, hence the decreased capacity (down to 40% of
2010 values). Decreased NAS capacity results in lower accident risk; yet, random acts of violence
against air transportation affects the stakeholders since very expensive security measures are
required to encounter the terror threat (Figure 5-2). In addition, the income loss caused by
decreased passenger capacity coupled with planned NextGen acquisition costs lead to airport
and corporate airline budget deficits that can be observed in the following figures.
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Figure 5-2 Evolution of NAS Safety Values with Time

5.3.3

"Regional Tensions"

The third simulated scenario is called "Regional Tensions" in order to represent a changing
global scenario where harmonious globalization is no longer available. Although demand for
aeronautics products and services is back up, increased oil cost deeply affects airline companies.
Also, stakeholders are obliged to spare funds for military initiated Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) programs, helping to keep the elevated terror level down. Due to the initial NextGen
enabler investments, the NAS safety values are better compared to baseline 2010 levels with
less likelihood of accident. For the years 2017 to 2020, the increase in air transportation capacity
does not deteriorate NAS safety. Even with a considerable terrorist attack risk, air
transportation is rather stable and safe (Figure 5-2).
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5.3.4

"Environmentally Challenged"

The "Environmentally Challenged" scenario initiated in 2022 simulates a very C02 conscious
world. At that time, conclusive evidence shows that carbon dioxide harms the planet. For that
reason, carbon based fuel usage is very limited and resources are very costly. With their large
area and heavy dependency on the use of transportation systems, developed nations face strict
regulations. High fuel prices hamper the demand for aerospace products and services where the
passenger capacity growth is small. That causes the increased consumer prices for all
transportation modes due to higher taxes on fuel. Airline companies tend to acquire larger
aircraft with higher load factors while decreasing flight frequency in order to reduce fuel usage.
Nevertheless, the NAS safety values start to migrate towards the unacceptable areas due to
increased capacity levels, but the unfavorable economic environment prevents further capacity
growth, and final air transportation safety values stay within the acceptable limits. At the end of
2025, the likelihood of an accident stays within the "remote" area; however, the consequences
of any aircraft related accident are now major due to increased passenger capacity of each
aircraft (Figure 5-2).

5.3.5

Stakeholder Specific Variables

5.3.5.1 Government Stakeholder Variables
The government stakeholder fulfills various roles including the military and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). The main goal of this stakeholder is to adjust tax values and
ensure NAS safety at all times. Also, during the increased terrorist activity levels, the military is
intended to take actions and make changes to the existing NAS, causing other stakeholders to
cooperate. The FAA (through government funding) can also initiate or mandate the acquisitions
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of certain enablers if it is deemed necessary by the participants. However, the majority of
government stakeholder actions are driven from the NRC scenarios.
The government variables (income tax, environmental tax, security tax, and fuel tax) are
given in Figure 5-3. As expected, during the "Pushing the Envelope" era (2010 - 2014), the U.S.
economy is strong and tax rates are relatively low, since there are no terrorist or environmental
concerns, there is no taxation on these areas. Furthermore, the end of year balance for the
government stakeholder shows no significant increase, allowing airports and airlines to invest in
NextGen technologies (Figure 5-4). Although the participant representing the government
stakeholder did not provide any assistance with ADS-B acquisition, the low tax rates supported
the other stakeholders. When asked for the motivation behind this behavior, the participant
responded that he/she wanted to see a common initiative from the corporate airlines/airports
before supporting the new technology acquisition. During discussions regarding the Data Link
enabler acquisition, the participant representing the government stakeholder decided to
provide $100 million to assist the corporate airline stakeholder. Both ADS-B and Data Link
enabler costs were above the budget limit of any stakeholder, requiring a coalition. The surfaced
coalition was between airline/airport and airline/government for ADS-B and Datalink,
respectively. The details of the enabler acquisition, timeline and funding are given in Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-3 Government Variables - Taxes and Total Fuel Price

In the introduction of "Grounded" scenario, the air transportation industry faces a steep
increase in security and income taxes in order to compensate for elevated global terror risk and
declining economic status. During the "Regional Tensions" era, the security threat remains
stable, with constant increase in income taxes and a slight increase in environmental taxes. The
fuel tax rate is kept constant since at the time of writing, this tax was planned to be abandoned.
Due to the decline in U.S. economic competitiveness and the disruption of today's global
structure, starting from year 2017, the government starts to collect taxes from air
transportation stakeholders. Fluctuations in the government end-of-year balance are caused by
fluctuations in the income levels of airport and corporate airline stakeholders given in Figure
5-4.
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Figure 5-4 Government Financial Data vs. Capacity

5.3.5.2 Airport Stakeholders
Airport stakeholders represent the finances of one large hub airport which is the average of
the largest eight airports in the United States. The main operating revenue for the airport
operators are aeronautical revenues (passenger airline landing fees, terminal arrival fees, rents
and utilities), and non-aeronautical revenues (terminal food and beverage, retail stores and duty
free). Operating expenses such as personnel compensation, supplies, and insurance costs were
included in the calculations; however, the airport stakeholder does not have any control over
these expenses. The operating expenses are assumed proportional to passenger capacity.
Figure 5-5 outlines the airport variables and the capacity change. As anticipated, during the
competitive air transportation environment (2010 - 2014), airport charges are rather constant,
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and they are generating low income for airports (Figure 5-6). During the "Grounded" era, the
fees climb in order to compensate for increased governmental taxes and increased NextGen
related expenses. Starting in 2017 and until 2022, airports raise fees constantly mostly because
air transportation remains the main choice of transportation in the United States. During this
time, airport and corporate stakeholder representatives exchanged pricing information in order
to determine their strategies. Due to the competition between the participants, the airport
stakeholder increased the landing fees towards the end of the game when the air transportation
capacity reached around 185% of the 2010 values.
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Examining the difference between the available balance and the end-of-year balance, it is
understood that the NextGen enabler acquisitions are largely paid-off by the year 2020 and the
end of year balance constantly rose until the year 2023 when the general public stakeholder
chose to adjust passenger capacity by decreasing it 10%. In order to gain back general public
interest, the airport stakeholder dramatically decreased fees resulting in a more than
anticipated passenger capacity the next year. In 2024, airports lost close to $500M and reincreased their fees during the last year in order to win the game.

5.3.5.3 Corporate Airlines Stakeholder
The corporate airlines stakeholder was represented by a formal airline employee who was
able to provide accurate pricing strategies. In order to afford the large expenses mandated by
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the FAA, the corporate airlines increased all of their fees throughout the game (Figure 5-7). One
prominent observation that surfaced during the gaming exercise was the increase of ticket
prices when the airline expenses are elevated. However, even when taxes are back to their
normal values, one can see that the airlines did not reflect the relief in their fees, which is in
accord with a real-world environment. Like the airports stakeholder, corporate airlines had to
decrease their ticket fees when the general public stakeholder reacted and adjusted the
passenger capacity. During that time, the raw ticket fee was decreased from $205 to $179;
however it climbed back up to $209 once passenger capacity recovered. Throughout the game,
passengers experienced a more than $50 increase in ticket prices ($377 compared to $325 in
2010, after the government taxes are reflected). Baggage fees were increased from $25 to $31
while reservation cancellation fees went up from $150 to $198 over the course of 16 years.
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Figure 5-7 Corporate Airlines Variables - Ticket Fees, Cancellation fees, and Baggage Fees

Airline companies are highly susceptible to jet fuel price change due to heavy consumption,
especially for the future capacity values reaching almost 3 times the current capacity.
Examining Figure 5-8, it is apparent that the corporate airlines managed to keep their end of
year balances on the positive. Although passenger capacity reached 240% of 2010 values and
ticket prices were increased more than 15%, baggage fees more than 25%, and reservation fees
more than 30%, corporate airlines still stayed below the profit margin level experienced at years
2017 and 2019. Fuel prices and increased taxation values are found to be the main reason why
airlines couldn't show as much profit as airports declared during the last half of the gaming
exercise.
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Figure 5-8 Corporate Airlines Financial Data vs. Capacity

5.3.5.4 General Public Stakeholder
As previously stated, the general public indirectly decides air travel passenger capacity at
the end of each time-step by comparing the transit time and cost for the two predetermined
routes. These one-way routes are the 228-mile Washington, DC (Union Station) to New York, NY
(Penn Station) and 437-mile Washington, DC (Union Station) to Boston, MA (South Station)
routes. As of March 2011, these two routes are the only two high speed rail routes existing in
the United States ("Acela Express" by Amtrak35). The three modes of transportation considered
are rail, automobile and air transportation. Air transportation values include travel time and
costs -estimate of a taxi ride from the airports (Dulles International Airport, John F. Kennedy
Airport, and Boston Logan Airport) to the rail stations (Union Station, Penn Station, and South
35

http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?c=AM Route C&pagename=am%2
FLavout&cid=1241245664867
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Station). Other assumptions can be given as: an automobile with 25mpg, $3.113/gallon national
gas average, arriving early to the departure airport, waiting for baggage at the destination
airport and taxi transportation transit times.
Figure 5-9 shows cost and transit times for the three modes of transportation with respect
to the simulation year for the first configuration, from Washington, DC to New York. For this
particular trip setup, driving is the lowest cost option; however, it takes over 4 hours and 30
minutes. Flying is the costliest method of all; however, door-to-door transit time is higher than
the high speed train option. With the introduction of future high speed rail systems, it is
assumed that rail prices will rise in order to compensate for increased infrastructure
investments while transit times will reach around 2 hours towards the end of the simulation.
Meanwhile, air transportation cost increases throughout the game while transit times vary with
the scenario: higher transit times during increased terrorist activities in the "Grounded" scenario
and slower travel speeds to abide the tightened C02 regulations in the "Environmentally
Challenged" scenario. Automobile transit times are assumed to be constant over the next 15
years while costs are slightly increased with higher fuel cost.
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Figure 5-9 General Public Announcement Variables (Configuration 1)

The second configuration variables are given in Figure 5-10. The pilot route for this setup is
over 400 miles, rendering the automobile option rather obsolete due to transit times over 9
hours, although the cost associated with automobile transportation is the lowest compared to
the remaining two transportation modes. Similarly, due to increased travel distance, the train
mode is not considerably cheaper than the air mode, but it is still much slower. The air
transportation mode provides the fastest service with the highest cost until around the year
2020 when High Speed Rail infrastructure starts to offer faster service times with increased
ticket prices. In year 2023, with increased air transportation fees and the introduction of high
speed rail, the general public stakeholder decides to adjust projected passenger capacity by -5%
(Table 5-1). By the end of the simulation, transit times for air and train modes of transportation
are comparable, and costs for both of the modes are on the rise.
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Figure 5-10 General Public Announcement Variables (Configuration 2)

The general public stakeholder participant adjusted air transportation capacity on six
occasions throughout the game. These interventions are given in Table 5-1 Public Intervention
Values and Provided Reasons. The 2015 terrorist attacks hamper air transportation capacity
10% more than anticipated; however, even with the same terror risk, in the following year, the
perceived terror risk is lower than projected. Even with the higher transportation costs and
slower travel speeds, the air transportation mode still gets adjusted by the general public
stakeholder and reaches 240% of the 2010 passenger capacity. This results in over 1.5 billion
passengers in the NAS.

Table 5-1 Public Intervention Values and Provided Reasons

Public Intervention
Amount

Reason Provided

+5%

Strong U.S. Economy + relatively inexpensive air
transportation fees

-10%

Perceived terror risk higher than anticipated

+10%

Ongoing perceived terror risk, lower than
anticipated

2022/ Environmentally Challenged

+5%

No increase on air transportation fees

mmm^m^mm^^

-5%

With upcoming High Speed Rail effect and the
increase air transportation fees

' 2024/Environrnentally Challenged

+10%

Passenger capacity increase in response to the
steep decrease in air transportation fees
following year 2023

- H 2025/ErMronmeBtally Challenged

+10%

Continuing satisfaction from air transportation
services

Year/Scenario
?& T* ^
•gi, % ~i

__

*'

2014/ Pushing the Envelope
2015/Grounded

M

5.1

?

Other Observations
The following figures are plots from various variables, demonstrating the correlation

between them. Figure 5-11 shows airline ticket fees versus capacity. The ongoing increase in
ticket fees in 2023 resulted in a lack of passenger capacity increase, and the resulting price-cut
from the airline companies allowed boosting the passenger capacity back up.
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Figure 5-11 Airline Ticket fees vs. Capacity

Figure 5-12 demonstrates the corporate airlines' budget change with respect to airport
landing fees. In a majority of the years, these two values are inversely proportional; higher
airport landing fees lead to lower airline end of year (or available balance) budget. The two
peaks in the corporate airline available funds that can be examined in years 2017 and 2019 can
be explained with relatively low airport landing fee charges of $6 and 13$ respectively.
Similarly, the lowest airline profit margin was experienced at a very high landing fee of $25.
Figure 5-14 shows the corporate airline budget versus ticket prices. Higher ticket prices lead to
higher profit margins; however, airline companies are affected by a number of factors such as
fuel prices and airport landing fees.
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Figure 5-12 Corporate Airlines Budget vs. Airport Landing Fee

Figure 5-13 provides the corporate airline budget with respect to fuel prices. Although fuel
prices only fluctuated below 5 cents, increased fuel prices drastically affected the airline budget
given the volume of passenger transportation. Even with the elevated ticket prices in 2025, the
airline stakeholder profit stayed well below the previous year's values.
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5.2

Enabler Acquisition Timeline and Surfaced Strategies

The selected 18 enablers from 7 different categories are all implemented within the first
three years of the game timeline. Since the participants of the game are real stakeholders within
the aviation field, they were aware of the necessity of key enablers like ADS-B and Data Link,
along with other safety related enablers (Table 5-2). For that reason, all the enabler acquisitions
were completed by 2013 unlike other gaming sessions played with non-aviation related
participants where the acquisition took place much later in the gaming session. One important
outcome of the acquisition strategy was the leadership of the corporate airline participant.
He/she was the initiator in purchasing high-dollar items such as ADS-B and Data Link. The cost
of such enablers were collected by increased ticket fees and other fees charged by the airline
companies. The corporate airline stakeholder compensated for the majority of the widespread
application of ADS-B technology which is the main enabler for many NextGen technologies. The
airport stakeholder provided a fraction of the technology acquisition (around 0.01%). The Data
Link acquisition was realized by the government contribution, around 25% of the Data Link
acquisition cost over the 11 years.
Both airports and airlines also contributed to the UAS integration to the National Airspace.
According to the scenario, from 2017 to 2021, airlines and airports were obligated to spare
$75M and $150M, respectively. Overall, airport authorities spent $1.570B on enablers, $33M
on ADS-B and $375M on UAS integration efforts, whereas airline authorities spared $2.316B on
enablers, $5.896B on ADS-B and Data Link combined and $750M on UAS integration.
Throughout the gaming activity, participants noted that after infrastructure investments
are completed, increased passenger capacity allowed them to obtain large profit margins.
However, if non-operational profit/expenses were included in the calculations, their profit
would be considerably lower. Examining the past 10 years of aviation data, high fluctuations in

the end-of-year balance are apparent due to severe fluctuations primarily in jet fuel prices. For
purposes of simplicity, fuel prices were kept rather stable on February 14th, 2011 game (an
increase of 4.5 cents).

Table 5-2 Enabler Acquisition Timeline and Strategies

Enabler Package
Definition

Denomination

Enabler
Acquisition
Planned

Enabler
Acquisition
Completed

Primary
Cost Bearer

OtherCost
Bearers

Total Cost

Coalition
Surfaced

ADS-B

AOSB

2011

2021

Airline
2.486M

Airports
33M

2.519M

Airport Airline

* iM<t§Sr*

Data Link

2012

2021

Airline
3,410M

Governmen
t 1.100M

4510M
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

Societies around the world depend on the proper functioning of various infrastructures.
However, changes in technology, societal needs and expectations, political shifts, and
environmental concerns cause infrastructure systems to underperform, requiring modernization
(Roos, et al., 2004). Infrastructure system modernizations are performed to accommodate
future capacity levels, address environmental concerns and meet sustainability needs. On the
other hand, transformations of large-scale complex infrastructure systems create significant
challenges. Their multi-dimensional complexity and increased societal contexts require different
approaches to plan, design, and manage such transformations. In order to accurately plan next
generation infrastructure systems, understating the interactions between technical, political and
economic factors is of paramount importance and obtaining capabilities related to developing,
evaluating and evolving infrastructure transformations accurately constitutes a fundamental
need.
In order to do so, the current research pursued the development and deployment of a
gaming based methodology to serve as a platform to generate, integrate, and evaluate data for
next generation infrastructure development efforts. To demonstrate its capabilities, the
methodology was applied to the NextGen framework. The multi-dimensional complexity and
stakeholder-rich environment of NextGen provided an accurate test bed for the complex sociotechnical system transformation. Subject matter expert opinions are used heavily to develop
gaming components, constitute participants, and finally, evaluate the validity of the framework.

The questionnaire provided in Appendix C was completed by participants via direct and indirect
questions throughout the gaming exercise and debriefing as well as follow up contacts.

6.1

Methodology Outcomes and Contributions

The developed methodology presented in this dissertation allows decision makers to obtain
several outcomes. The most important contribution of the methodology is related to the
understanding and communication of complexity and interdependencies associated with largescale system transitions among stakeholders. For the unique cases where the participants are
the actual stakeholders, improved knowledge of the system and awareness of its characteristics
yields a desirable environment for data elicitation. Coupling gaming with other methods, the
methodology can be applied to generate preliminary data regarding the systems' characteristics
such as capacity, power generation, throughput, and risk evaluation/acceptance, while using a
systemic approach, considering both social and technical aspects of the system. The
methodology proposed within this dissertation can help generate and aggregate data for future
status and transient phases of the infrastructure system transitions. The developed platform
allows decision makers to test and validate scenarios while accommodating on-the-fly changes
for adjustment and improvements from participants.
The case study developed within this dissertation allowed decision makers to envisage NAS
safety values over a 15-year transition period from the current to the future system visualized
by a risk matrix and As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle. The data generation
session also revealed potential strategic behavior and pricing strategies.
Although demonstrated using the NextGen transformation, the developed methodology
can be applied to any large-scale infrastructure system thanks to its SoS approach and modular
structure, allowing planners to employ existing tools and methods to the problem at hand. The
gaming based methodology can be successfully adapted to any infrastructure system where

large stakeholder interactions, multi-level complexities and high level interdependencies are
present (e.g. energy infrastructure, information and telecommunications, emergency services,
etc.). Depending on the need, the methodology can be followed to generate an application for
scenario testing, preliminary system response predictions, simulating capacity and/or risk levels,
prioritizing resources, identifying potential future issues (strategic behavior, public perception,
etc.).

6.2

Limitations of the Study

Unlike computer models or other hard-science alternatives, the development, execution
and validation phases of the methodology presented within this research require extensive
subject matter expert contribution. For that reason, the gaming environment delineates the
physical presence of all the prominent stakeholders of that particular infrastructure system on
several occasions. It has proven quite difficult to identify, contact, and bring together all the
experts and stakeholders under one roof throughout the development of the methodology
mainly because of conflicting schedules and cost of travel.
Besides logistics limitations, using serious gaming for academic research raises concerns
due to challenges in validating the methodology. The interdisciplinary nature of simulation and
gaming, in most cases, limits the use of this approach for educational/training purposes in
businesses. Researchers believe that further work must be performed to theorize and establish
serious gaming as a field of study; whether simulation and gaming is a beneficial tool or an
academic field is still an uncertainty (Shiratori, 2003). However, in a more recent study, Mayer
indicates the use of gaming as a serious research method yielding an increasing number of Ph.D.
students over the last decade (Mayer, 2009).
Also, the accurate representation of a large and complex system, fusing multiple
perspectives and multiple disciplines, has proven challenging in practice (Brewer, 2007). For

instance, the selection of scenario elements and the actual composition of the scenario are
based primarily on the game developer's perspective and there is no rule for scenario
development to guide game builders about what to include and what to omit (deLeon, 1975).
Similar to the scenario construct, the abstraction of the elements of the reference system and
translating them to the model poses a challenge. At any given time during the game
development stage, it is crucial to iteratively check the assumptions against the reference
system (Peters, et al., 1998). When developed properly, the plastic nature of gaming, allowing
modelers to shape, bend, stretch and adapt to any problem at hand, was proven to be a great
way of integrating the technical-physical complexity with social-political complexity, supporting
the highly socio-technical and complex environment of next generation infrastructure
development (Mayer, 2009).

6.3

Future Work and Methodology Expansion

Due to the characteristics of system-of-systems engineering methodology adopting a
modular and flexible modeling environment, the current study has great potential for future
expansion. The flexibility associated with the uses of a serious gaming platform enables the
introduction of already existing risk assessment, cost analysis or other methodologies in order to
investigate different aspects of the problem. For the cases where multi-stakeholder situations
and complexity are a prominent part of the problem (which is believed the case on most large
scale, complex systems), the developed methodology can be expanded to accommodate such
needs.
The future phases of the case study exercise can include other aspects of NextGen related
technologies and methodologies besides the safety component. The increased capacity and
respective environmental concerns induce more socio-economic problems that require
investigation. Although this research adopted the passenger fatality as the primary
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consequence indicator, other damage factors like accident related costs (damage to the aircraft,
legal liabilities, etc.) or loss of reputation can also be included in the consequences scale of the
risk definition. Also, additional capabilities can be brought into the data analysis and validation
section of the methodology where the generated data can be used as a baseline for computer
simulation models. It may be possible to limit dependence on expert and stakeholder
participation; however, the feasibility of this approach must be further examined.
Typically, developing a serious game takes one to two years, and there are cases where the
game constantly gets updated and enhanced, taking over 6 years (Duke, 1980; Geurts, et al.,
2007; Mayer, 2009). Ensuring the seamless integration of the software and techniques covered
in this methodology will take additional efforts and serious gaming exercises.
Lastly, the methodology developed within this research can be applied to other large
infrastructure transitions or other sociotechnical systems where strong stakeholder interactions
occur, e.g. power or telecommunications infrastructures, national security, and healthcare. It is
possible to experience and collect information regarding the counter-intuitive behavior of
complex systems with methodologies harnessing the capabilities of both classical hard sciences
and soft sciences alike, helping plan, develop and manage sustainable systems for generations
to come.
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APPENDIX A - UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TO NATIONAL
AIRSPACE

A.l Introduction36
A . l . l . Overview
Over the past decade, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or unmanned aircraft systems UAS
are used interchangeably throughout the text) have proven their values and capabilities via
various applications around the globe. Initiated by the military, today UAVs are In high demand
since they provide endurances and flight environments beyond the limits of manned systems.
Civil government, scientific research institutes and commercial markets have already seized the
low-cost, flexible, simple operation opportunities associated with UAV applications. However,
barriers like lack of airspace regulations, airworthiness, safety, and standards applying to
manned systems still remain the chief issues to address. Various initiatives are brought to life to
support the creation and expansion of a civil/commercial UAV market, aiming to integrate
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS).
The problems associated with UAS integration into NAS are grouped under five general
categories: safety, security, ATM, regulation, and socio-economic factors. Although UAS
integration possesses case-specific issues such as public apprehension or consensus on UAS
concepts of definitions, some of the technical issues like the lack of information data exchange
networks or automated collision avoidance systems are within the NextGen framework. The
majority of the NextGen enabling technologies inherently allow the seamless integration of UAS
into NAS in the coming years. However, the socio-technical issues including regulations and
public perception have to be addressed in order to achieve a fully integrated airspace
(DeGarmo, 2004).
A.l.2 Brief History and Integration Issues
Since the 1950's, the U.S. military has spent more than $25 billion on UAS development.
The 2006 Department of Defense Budget alone provided $1.7 billion for unmanned vehicles,
including ground, underwater, aerial, and combat aerial unmanned vehicles (U.S. Office of
Management and Budget, 2006). The U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense employed UAS
in various scenarios, including Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, and
Kosovo (DeGarmo, 2004; The U.S. Air Force, 2005; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2003;
Office of Secretary of Defense, 2005). The U.S. and other foreign armed forces continue to seek
a more stable UAS development environment, eventually rendering the UAS one of the vital
components of the military. As stated in U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2006),
unmanned systems are considered to provide a major advantage to the U.S. forces on the
36

The goal of this section is to present an object-oriented based software approach to demonstrate
the feasibility of accurately addressing the complexity of such an integration plan, while introducing the
"business process" concept.
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battlefield, while decreasing risks to troops by replacing the pilot with UAS on dull, dirty, or
dangerous missions [8]. For these reasons, increased resources are committed to the acquisition
and research of related UAS technologies worldwide37.
Unlike underwater and terrestrial unmanned vehicles, a remotely piloted aircraft's
operation area carries a high risk of interference with the National Airspace System (NAS). For
this reason, current high altitude long endurance (HALE) UAS are highly restricted as to how,
when, and where they can operate within NAS. Remotely operated aircraft (ROA) within the
HALE class include Global Hawk, Predator B/Altair, Pathfinder, Helios, etc. and applications such
as military reconnaissance, remote sensing, global disaster monitoring are demonstrated by the
Department of Defense (DoD), NASA, and Department of Energy (DoE) (Bauer & Dann, 2005;
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). Since there is no regulatory or procedural
guidance on how the unmanned aircraft operations are executed, these types of missions are
considered "one time" events, treated as exceptional, requiring flight authorization on every
single mission. Federal Aviation Administration issues a Certificate of Authorization (CoA) for
HALE ROA, whose operational environment is similar to manned aircraft in order to maintain
safety within NAS. CoA regulates the unmanned aircraft itself, pilot, operating and flight rules
(Bauer & Dann, 2005).
Although UAS capabilities have greatly excelled; the lack of UAS classification and standards
still constitute the main roadblock before a fully integrated, safely operated National Airspace.
Considering the various UAS sizes and configurations from the size of an insect to that of a
commercial airliner, determining a universal UAS definition itself poses a great challenge (U.S.
Congressional Research Service, 2003). The commercial and civil government market
expectations have driven various initiatives, associations, and standard organizations to bring
UAS operations inline with the manned operational environment and the ability to withstand
any loads created through the commercial and civil government market. Examples of such
associations, organizations, and initiatives are the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems
International (AUVSI), American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NASA), Unmanned
Vehicle Systems (UVS) International, Access 5, and UAS National Industry Team (UNITE)
(DeGarmo, 2004; Office of Secretary of Defense, 2007; U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2008).
Potential unmanned systems are prone to bringing more complexity and capacity issues to
already saturated commercial airline markets and transportation infrastructure. Caused by

The opportunities associated with UAVs are not only perceived by the military authorities; many
commercial applications are sought, especially in the small aircraft market. Applications such as crop
monitoring, communications relay, utility inspection, news and media support, aerial advertising, cargo,
commercial imaging, and security, to name a few, are all potential UAV users, more economic and flexible
than their space-based or manned aircraft counterfeits (DeGarmo, 2004). The civil government is
considered to be one of the primary UAV user, particularly in homeland security. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) requested $10 million to support the Coast Guard and Border Patrol operations.
DHS applications include watching coastal waters, patrol borders, protecting major oil and gas lines, drug
surveillance, etc. Other civil applications cover traffic surveillance, emergency response, medical resupply,
forest fire monitoring, flood mapping, nuclear/biological/chemical sensing and tracking, land use
mapping, etc (DeGarmo, 2004; U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2003)
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increased UAS flights, the air traffic will be affected via flight paths, performance criteria, and air
services while labor disruptions will be created (DeGarmo, 2004). System interoperability,
navigation, communications involving air traffic controllers and UAS are leading issues with air
traffic aspects. According to the U.S. Military UAS flight data, unmanned systems have a poor
safety record, almost two levels of magnitude (100 times) higher than risks associated with
manned aircraft and 50 times higher than F-16 fighters (U.S. Congressional Research Service,
2003). However, the high "mishap" (accident) rates are reconciled with the nature of military
uses and low redundancy component failures. One other major concern is the lack of secure
communication bandwidths required for UAS applications comprising the vehicle, ground
control station, data link infrastructure and security (DeGarmo, 2004). Socio-economic factors
including insurance liability, public acceptance, and government investment are other key
components that actively drive and restrain future UAS markets.
The undertaken challenges require insuring reliability, security, sustainability and
affordability of the transformation and adaptation of the existing unmanned aircraft system
(UAS) to NAS. As discussed previously, various initiatives are taken in order to obtain the desired
integration state of unmanned aerial vehicles and NAS. DeGarmo (2004) provides an overview of
the relevant issues under five main categories: safety, security, air traffic, regulation, socioeconomics. This section contains the primary findings of a project where the issues covered by
DeGarmo (2004) are adopted and used on object-oriented paradigm based software as an input.
The software is called TopEase® and handles problems as "business processes" and provides a
desirable end-state of an enterprise, business, or an application while highlighting the gap
between the desired and current states. The goal of the project was to demonstrate the
preliminary feasibility of applying the UAS-NAS integration plan development to TopEase®
environment with limited data on hand (mostly publicly available due to the sensitive material,
(Bauer & Dann, 2005; DeGarmo, 2004; The U.S. Air Force, 2005). For this reason, at the time of
writing, the results would be the preliminary confirmation from subject-matter experts
according to the validity of the application.
A.2 Object-Oriented Programming: An Overview
A.2.1 An Overview
The approach that has been followed during the project was based upon the TopEase®
software which runs an object- oriented programming (OOP) paradigm in the background. The
OOP paradigm uses "objects" to design applications and computer programs. Object-Oriented
Modeling (OOM) may be seen as a collection of cooperating objects, as opposed to a traditional
view in which a program may be seen as a list of instructions to the computer. The real system
is modeled through the use of classes where each object acts like an independent entity with a
distinct role or responsibility. OOP uses several concepts/techniques from previously
established paradigms, including inheritance, modularity, polymorphism, and encapsulation
supporting the development of efficient class structures. Key concepts are provided in the next
section.

A.2.2 Key Concepts
•

Class defines the abstract characteristics of a thing, including the thing's characteristics
(its attributes or properties) and the things it can do (its behaviors or methods).

•

Object is a particular instance of a class and executable software representations of realworld concepts and is a software package that includes ail the necessary data and
procedures to represent a real-world object for a specific set of purposes.

•

Message Passing signifies the objects interacting with each other by sending requests
for services known as messages.

•

Encapsulation is the mechanism by which related data and procedures are bound
together within an object. It conceals the exact details of how a particular class works
from objects that use its code or send messages to it.

•

Polymorphism is the behavior that varies depending on the class in which the behavior is
invoked; that is, two or more classes can react differently to the same message. The
power of polymorphism is that it greatly simplifies the logic of programs by shortening
and increasing the execution speed.

•

Inheritance is the mechanism that allows classes to be defined as special cases, or
subclasses, of each other (Gossain & Anderson, 1989; Pulfer & Schmid, 2006).

A.2.3 TopEase® Software
Once the OOP paradigm is understood, it is easier to place the objects, classes and message
products throughout the software hierarchy. Unmanned aerial system (UAS) integration to NAS
creates an interlinked and multidimensional challenge when the highly regulated air
transportation infrastructure is taken into account, along with safety, security, air traffic,
regulatory, and socio-economic aspects of the problem (DeGarmo, 2004). By defining the
stakeholders, systems, subsystems, communications, regulations, processes, activities, etc. it
creates a holistic view of the problem, with a structure that allows focusing on the details,
limited only by the amount of information provided. TopEase® is commercially available objectoriented-programming based software developed by Pulinco Engineering AG based in
Switzerland38. The software has been used in various areas like banking, government sectors,
solution providers, consulting firms, etc. The main page of the software is given in the following
figure (Figure Al).

TopEase was developed as a guide to help the managers understand the current status of the
company and to predict its future development. For that reason, TopEase aims to provide the holistic
view on the system to manage the complexity and obtain transparency when managing transformation
and improvement processes Figure A2 shows TopEase's ability to provide a full-scale view of the system,
successfully encompassing the visualization of the system complexity
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Figure A2 TopEase8 providing insights on system complexity

TopEase® software helps manage complex systems in transition from a current paradigm
(initial state, or A) to an improved future paradigm (end state, or 8), called Gap Analysis. In the
scope of the project, the current UAS operations status and a desirable future where unmanned
systems can fly across the nation w i t h similar safety, reliability, and ease t o the commercial and
military manned aircraft are taken as phases A and B, respectively.
The Gap Analysis allows tracking of key performance parameters (risk, compliance with
regulations, measurements against set goals, etc.) to measure progress. Along the integration,
TopEase® keeps track of the current, past and desirable parameter values and monitors risk and
other measurements. Since the end state, B, is not (cannot be) precisely defined by any
authority, the object oriented paradigm behind the software allows flexibility for shaping the
desired end-state and related transition states noted as Ti, T2, etc. (Figure A3)

Decisions enabled by flight research

Current use
of UAVs
ln N A S

^
Transition states

Desired
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Figure A3 TopEase8 handling various transformation phases

A.3 Methodology and Modeling of the Problem
A.3.1 Business Process Approach
TopEase® is largely developed for enterprise modeling, called a business approach, where it
enables users t o model their company/organization including the resource infrastructure,
requirements, processes, activities, control flows, information models, etc. while the ultimate
goal is to control compliance, improve performance and manage risks (Pulfer & Schmid, 2006).
Based on the project definition, the UAS-NAS integration is modeled using limited literature and
data coverage, mainly aimed t o demonstrate the feasibility of the business process approach
application t o the matter at hand 39 .
The attributes of OOP paradigm differ f r o m any methods and tools in such a way that it
allows obtaining descriptions and views (organization, process, workflow, etc.) of an enterprise

The crucial point on using TopEase8 is due to its object oriented programming paradigm. The
concept of the software is to introduce predefined artifacts to describe the enterprise in a specific time
and situation. Each artifact has a behavior and is defined by several attributes which are identified
depending on their usability. For example, the "collision avoidance" clause under the Safety process is
modeled as activities and processes, enabling them to communicate with any other object in the model.
On a similar manner, risk is defined as an object, via identifying various risk templates and applying it to
any relevant area.
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since all the views represent one single view and are not related to each other (Pulfer & Schmid,
2006). TopEase® software enables full visualization of complex systems on one single "Big
Picture". To illustrate that concept, a given UAS-NAS integration model can include the
information from any physical room within the company infrastructure along with its connected
IT network to the performance measurement history against a set of Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations that the company is aiming to comply. This is possible due to
the definition of OOP where every artifact is modeled as objects with their own specifications.
The originality of this work lies within the application of the project contents to the objectoriented paradigm based business approach.
The processes, risk associated with the processes, organization schemes, compliances with
FAA and other regulations, relationships between various processes and stakeholders,
organizational departments, regulations, and measurement/risk templates that are modeled
within the project are all based upon the literature coverage.
A.3.2 Modeling Assumptions
Due to the limited time and nature of the project, the unmanned aerial system to NAS
integration model required some assumptions which will be presented in this section (The
author of this dissertation was a prime investigator). Organizational structure is adopted from
Bauer & Dann, (2005) where Access 5 is considered as the "actual" group dedicated to UAS-NAS
integration where it is solely a research project/collaboration and one of the initiatives, involved
with NASA and other stakeholders. Since TopEase® models the enterprise and assigns various
processes and tasks to departments and personnel, it was necessary to inherit the
organizational diagram from the reference to build the backbone of the model. The organization
consists of five integrated product teams (IPTs); policy, technology, simulation, implementation,
and flight test, forming the system engineering and integration team (SEIT). SEIT and Project
control, facilitation and collaboration teams from the Access 5 project which is steered by NASA,
DoD, FAA, and UAS National Industry Team and Vehicle Systems Program.
Processes and activities are adopted directly from DeGarmo (2004) where safety, security,
air traffic, regulation and socio-economic are five main processes, all containing three to nine
processes, along with activities. Figure A4 demonstrates the main processes and processes.

UAV - NAS
Integration

••(standards)
Figure A4 UAV-NAS integration main processes and processes

Risk data is taken from reference (DeGarmo, 2004). However, the information consists of
only at the process level. As an example to risk data, the collision avoidance process risk is
provided in Table A l . Each process risk is measured upon five criteria: safety criticality, technical
complexity, legal complexity, socio-political risk, and economic cost. The five-point Likert scale
(low, low-to-medium, medium, medium-to-high, and high) is transformed to TopEase® risk
template and applied to all the processes.
Table A l . Process Risk Evaluation Categories (Collision Avoidance)
Safety Criticality
2.1.1. Collision
Avoidance

High

Complexity
High

Legal Complexity
Low

Socio-Poiittcat

Low

Economic Cost
Low to High

Considering the project layers, risk information is only available at the process level. Since
every process contains various activities, the risk at that level is not provided by the references.
Also, risk on a higher level (i.e. safety) is not available. TopEase® does not extrapolate nor
calculate the risk on the higher project levels. Risk understanding of TopEase® is mainly for
demonstration and tracking purposes, like any other information, risk data needs to be
imported to TopEase® using other risk calculation or vulnerability determination engines. At the
writing of this paper, TopEase® did not have an interface enabling risk calculation feature.
The performance criteria, such as FAA requirements, regulations, or compliance with the
socio-economic factors are extracted from reference (DeGarmo, 2004). The process-to-process,
activity (process)-to-IPT teams, activity (process) - to - regulations and all other object-to-object
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interrelationships (named work products under TopEase®) are investigated and created within
the model, depending on the object's nature.
A.4 The Outcomes
The Big Picture: TopEase® enables users to see the highest-level picture of the meta-system,
where every item is linked to lower-level information, only limited with the level of data entered
to the model. By creating the diagram below (Figure A5), developers can examine the system
and also have the liberty to focus in on any of the components, activities, processes or
relationships to gather details regarding every aspect of the transition process.
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Figure A5 Overview of the High-Level System Interactions

On a lower-level diagram, it is possible to see the interactions, inputs and outputs, work
products, overall risk associated with each process (color-coded) and links on the processes to
reach activity level information.
A.4.1 Visualization
One of the most significant contributions of OOP based software usage is the modeling
ease; however, TopEase® enables users to visualize the whole enterprise (or organization
providing the service) from the highest possible project level to the section of a specific
regulation including all the relationships within the enterprise. Figure A6 demonstrates the first
process under the Air Traffic Management (ATM) main process, which is also called ATM. The
level of detail is decreased for the purposes of this section; however, the structure given below
can be seen at the highest (or lowest) level desired. The ATM process consists of 5 subprocesses, all containing activities that can be accessed when clicked on the sub-process. The
external agents or stakeholders imposing any regulations or requirements are DoD, DARPA, UAV
National Industry Team and FAA. The stakeholder relationships are given as work products and
are shown with connecting arrows. The diagram is completely interfaced to link at any part of
the picture, enabling simple navigation.
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Figure A6 Air Traffic Management process diagram and its interrelations

A.4.2 Measurements
Risk measurement can be documented in various ways. Risk maps, risk scorecards and
automatically generated and updated risk documents help to keep track of ongoing risks
throughout the big scope of the UAS-NAS integration. In a similar manner, other measurements
such as process progress, compliance with regulations and requirements can also be visualized
via measurement scorecards and measurement documents (Pulfer & Schmid, 2006).

As the conventional methods and tools provide, the risk maps can be obtained through the
TopEase® risk templates, constituting of the product of impact and likelihood. Figure A7
demonstrates the risks associated with ATM processes. Besides the likelihood and impact, risk
templates also include risk appetite (introducing the risk perception) and responsible,
accountable, concerned, informed (RACI) parties. As all other diagrams, risk maps are
hyperlinked to associated objects in the project (Pulfer & Schmid, 2006).
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Figure A7 Risk Maps for ATM Processes

Another method of demonstrating risk is through the risk scorecards. Figure A8 shows the
risk level for each process under the ATM main process, including the last values. The
measurement scorecards are flexible since they are attached to the templates that can be
modified in the case where the "to be" description of the dynamic UAS-NAS transformation
evolves through time.
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Figure A8 ATM processes risk scorecard

Compliance with the standards and meeting the changing requirements of various
stakeholders are visualized with spider-web scorecards that enable past, current and target
performance parameters. The business model concept provides strategies and goals for each
process (or activity) that can be traced in terms of progress. Figure A9 and Figure AlO provide
the overall process progress and risk scorecards for each element given in Figure A3. Various
scorecards can be generated for every layer of the UAS-NAS integration plan, however, due to
limited information in the scope of the project, only fictitious values are used for limited layers
(Pulfer&Schmid, 2006).
Collision Avoidance [Process]
Government Investment [ P r a c e s s J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S y s t e m Reliability [Process]
Public Acceptance [Process j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H u m a n Factors [Process]
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Weather [Process]
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Ground Infrastructure [Process]
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Figure A9 Comprehensive Measurement Scorecard
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Figure AlO Comprehensive Risk Scorecard

Besides the risk and measurement visualization tools, TopEase® contains extensive
reporting capability outputting to Word, Excel, or HTML formats. The responsibility,
requirements, processes, and relationships matrices can also be developed. Once the enterprise
infrastructure information is input into the model, it is possible to simulate and investigate the
cascading effects of a service disruption (i.e. absent enterprise branch/person or nonoperational enterprise IT servers). For the UAS-NAS integration model, it is possible to replicate
a case where the policy IPT fails to comply with one or multiple FAA regulations and visualize the
various effects of the issue on other processes.
A.5 Conclusions

The advantages unmanned aerial systems provide will eventually require a fully integrated
manned-unmanned National Airspace in the future. Like in the early ages of aviation, unmanned
systems will mature and bring the same or even superior safety features that manned systems
offer today. However, replacing pilots and crew on dangerous, dirty, and dull missions will
necessitate an intensive planning, execution, and monitoring capability that can ensure a
reliable, sustainable and efficient transition. Most of the technical issues associated with UASNAS integration are already on the NextGen agenda, and issues associated with poor UAS
reliability and lack of UAS classification schemes and definitions will be solved during the
NextGen implementation plan.
With limited resources, the UAS-NAS integration project was applied to an object oriented
paradigm approach, and results were provided. As the approach taken is a type of "feasibility
study" using TopEase®, the sole validation lies within the opinions of air traffic control (ATC)
subject matter experts within the university staff. The approach is still under investigation and
discussions will determine the possibility of an in-depth application in the future. The
technological advances, cost containment, regulatory controls, public acceptance and numerous
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other factors will determine the direction and strength of the UAS market. Since the prospects
for UAS growth look promising, a dynamic, "big-picture" instrument capable of capturing the
complexity of the integration is crucial for success.
Future work involving the interfaces of various risk and vulnerability calculation tools will
even bring more management and execution support for future efforts in UAS-NAS integration.
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APPENDIX B - RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL

Risk is defined as the product of the probability of an accident and its respective
consequences. The methodology calculates probabilities and consequences separately (See
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1996).
B.l Consequences
The consequences of a certain accident are constructed with respect to the characteristics
of the substance and its correcting factors regarding the area, population density, accident
geometry, etc.

Ca,s=AxSxfAxfdxfm
Ca

Consequences per accident, and per substance (fatalities/accident)

s

A

The calculated area based on the various inputs based on each class and

amount of substance
°

Population density within the impact area

f

f

•> A Jd
fm

Correcting factors for the impact area geometry
Correcting factor for the cases if people within the distance have shelter,

opportunity to flee, or a way to find out about the event before it happens (e.g. warning from
odor, tanks that explode one by one)
Each component of the formula is entered from the existing tables where data is collected
from extensive calculations, modeling, and expert opinions. The formula outputs a casualty
number for each type of accident which will be matched with its respective probability of
occurrence.
B.2 Probabilities
The probability of each substance installation (e.g. flammable liquid stored in a processing
plant) is calculated via the following formula. The average probability number (used as a starting
point) for each installation is determined by N*

s

and varies by each type of substance and

installation. The rest of the components in the equation are used to adjust this initial estimation
in the presence of various correcting factors.

N„=N*ltS+nl+nf+n0+np
Nis

Probability number for an accident to happen for a substance within an

installation
N*

s

Average probability n u m b e r for t h e installation and the substance

n,

Correction parameter f o r t h e frequency o f loading/unloading operations

nf

Correction parameter f o r t h e safety systems associated w i t h flammable

substances
no

Correction parameter f o r t h e organizational and management safety

n

Correction parameter for wind direction towards the populated area

Based on the correction factors, the average N

S

value is recalculated and converted back

into probability values based on the logarithmic relationship given above. In the same stream of
thought, a similar approach is used to estimate the risks of transportation of hazardous
substances, (Nt s ) . The formula and description are given below.

Mtj=N*u+nc+nte+np
N *, s

Average probability number for the transport of the substance

nc

Correction parameter for the safety conditions of the transport system

nR

Correction parameter for the traffic density

n.

Correction parameter for wind direction towards the populated area

B.3 Estimation of the Societal Risks
The previous two sections provided calculations of human casualties (fatalities) associated
with an accident, along with the probabilities of such accidents occurring. The risk to the public
from these activities is estimated by combining these two values.
Consequences are categorized with respect to fatalities, and the probability classes are
categorized by one order of magnitude of the number of accidents per year. The results
obtained from the consequence and probability calculations are represented on the risk matrix,
providing an overall picture of the risk. The interpretation of the risk matrix provides the
acceptability criteria for the societal risk. The thresholds for acceptable risks can be based on
accident frequency (or probabilities) (Figure Bl), consequences (Figure B2), or a combination of
both (or ALARA principle) (Figure B3).
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APPENDIX C - PARTICIPATION FEEDBACK & VALIDATION

Ranking
Validation Category

Definitions/ Implications

i
Face Validity

The game structure or outcomes "seem"
to reproduce the reference system

The theory and the assumptions on
which the game was built can be shown
isomorphic to the reference system
Actor interactions, information flow, and
negotiations are congruent to the
reference system

Overall representation of NAS is accurate

Evaluation and ranking of the validity of the
assumptions with respect to NAS

Stakeholder relationships within NAS are
comparable to the real world

Structural Validity

Individual constructs constituting the

Serious Gaming, Rapid Risk Assessment

methodology

Model, COTS Software (Logical Decisions)

Internal consistency of the way the
constructs are put together in the
method
Appropriateness of the case study to be
used to verify the performance of the
method

Contents of High
Level Architecture (Figure 3.1)

NAS as a multi-stakeholder and complex
sociotechnical system transition platform

Performance Validity

The results of the game are comparable
to the results in reality

NextGen 2025 Risk Values, Expected NAS
future characteristics and stakeholder
relationship representations

The achieved usefulness is linked to

Considering the holistic approach rather than

applying the methodology

conventional methods

Usefulness of the method is beyond the

Any complex and large-sociotechnical system

case study

involving multiple stakeholders

1-

Totally Disagree,

2-

Somewhat Disagree

3-

Neither Agree or Disagree

4-

Somewhat Agree

5-

Totally Agree

2

3

4

5

APPENDIX D - INSTUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPROVAL DOCUMENTS

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
PROJECT TITLE: Avrat'On Safety Data Generation and Analysis Using Serious Gaming Methods
INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision whether to say YES or NO to
participation in this research, and to record the consent of those who say YES The research Aviation Safety Data
Generation and Analysis Us.ng Serious Gaming Metnods' will be conducted in 4111 Monarch Way, Suite 406 in Norfolk,
VA
RESEARCHERS
Researchers of this stucy are Dr Adrian V Gheorghe RP! {Professor Old Dominion University Batten College of
Engineering Engineering Management and Systems Engineering Dept), Dr Sharon M Jones {Technical Monitor NASA
Langley, Aeronaut.cs Systems Analysis Branch Systems Analysis ana Concepts Directorate) and Ersin Ancel, Graduate
Research Assistant ("Old Dominion University, Batten College of Engineering, Engineering Management and Systems
Engineering Dept)
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY
The research study aims to generate data for future aviation systems Corventonal expert elicitation methods are found
to be successful m generat.ng data for complex technical systems (e g data generation for a conceptual launch vehicle)
However, data regarding complex sociotechnical systems with multiple components (eg National Arspace System
comprised of technical, political social and organizational aspects) are rather difficult to obtain with the conventional
expert el citation methods (Branstorming, Delphi Methods, Nominal Group Technique, etc) For that purpose serious
gaming methods are proposed to be used in tandem with other conventional techniques to generate data for futu-e
systems This research study aims to test the proposed oiatfo-m and gererate initial data for further improvements
If you decide to participate, then you will ,oin a study involving a role-playing environment You will be asked to represent
a certain role in the National Airspace System. Your task wit, be to interact with other players of the game in order to
review, discuss and decide on future aviation systems Researcners will contact you with n one week of the exercise to
provide you with the pre iminary results and ask for your input/comments or the research methodology or the results if
you say YES. then your participat.on will last up to 4 hours at Old Dominion University National Centers for System of
Systems Engineering (NCSOSE), 4111 Monarch Way Suite 406, Norfolk VA Approximately 20 to 25 participants from
various backgrounds will be participating in this study
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA
You received the invitation to participate in this study given your current or past experience with aviation in the National
Airspace System (e g researches pilot, airport operations, etc j or to be representative of the general pub.ic You should
be over the age of 18 to oarticipate in this study
RISKS AND BENEFITS
RISKS Tne sole perceivable risk in this study is the loss of confidentiality If you decide to participate in th s study, you
will be asked to discuss your ideas and engage in conversations with other participants These discussions and outcomes
will be noted However in order to min.mize the risks, the researchers wu. remove al, link.ng identifiers from the extractec
data Yours and your company s information will not be stored on any database or file cabinet Ard as with any research
there is some possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet been identified
Benefits There are no airect benefits to yo^ in participating in this study
COSTS AND PAYMENTS
Your oarticlpation in this study is absoluteiy voluntary. The researchers are unable to give you any payment for
participating in this study However snacks anc refreshments will be provided tnroughout the study
NEW INFORMATION
If the researchers find new information during this study that would reasonably change your decision about participating
then they will give it to you
CONFIDENTIALITY
The researchers wll take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as individual opinions, discussions and
aersonal information 'eiated to you or your employer confidential The 'esearchers will remove identifiers from the
rformation store information in a lockec filing cabinet and a secure electronic database prior to its processing. The
results of this study may be used in reports presenta; ons, and publications but the researcher <ivill not identify you or
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The contents of this appendix includes the IRB documents that were generated following the
review process, including the Informed consent document and audio/video documentation

your employer. Of course, your records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with
oversight authority.
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away or withdraw from the
study - at any time. Your decision will not affect your relationship with Old Dominion University/NASA Langley, or
otherwise cause a loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled.
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY
If you say YES. then your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in the event of
harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to give you any money,
insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a
result of participation in any research project, you may contact the responsible principal investigator or investigators at the
following phone numbers or Dr. George Maihafer the current IRB chair at 757-683-4520 at Old Dominion University, who
will be glad to review the matter with you.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form or have had it read to
you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, tne research study, and its risks and benefits The researchers
should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, then the
researchers should be able to answer them:
Dr. Adrian Gheorghe (Principal Investigator) 757-277-6280 agheorgh@odu.edu
Dr. Sharon M. Jones {Technical Monitor) 757-864-7642 sharon m.jones@nasa.gov
Ersin Ancel (Graduate Research Assistant) 757-272-2364 eance001@odu.edu
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or this form, then you should
call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at
757-683-3460.
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to participate in this study. The
researcher should give you a copy of this form for your records.

Subject's Printed Name & Signature

Date

INVESTIGATOR'S STATEMENT
I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of this research, including benefits, risks, costs, and
any experimental procedures. I have describee the rights and protections afforded to human subjects and have done
nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this subject into participating. I am aware of my obligations under state and
federal laws, and promise compliance. I have answered the subject's questions and have encouraged him/her to ask
additional questions at any time during the course of this study. I have witnessed the above signature(s) on this consent
form.

L l -":!'il-::L'H 7 l eB *± fC J
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TO

Adriar Gheorghe PhD
Responsible Project Investigator

FROM

George Maihafer PT PhD
Chairperson, IRB

RE

DATF-

.)'.'«
'

/.>';*£>
/

Addendum Request to "Using Serious Gaming for Next Generation
Infrastructure Data Elicitation ( ODU IRB # 10 - 157)

Febiuar> 3.2011

After review of the amended revisions to ODU IRB # 1 0 - 5 7 "Using Serious
Gaming for Next Generation Infrastructure Data Elicitation", I approve the
change in an expedited review manner. The amendment to the methodology of
the study is as follows
The addition of a consent for photo/video materials to the study
A Progress report or Close out Report will be required one year from the original
approval date (November, 2011) of the study application to the Old Dominion
University Institutional Review Board Please let me know if I can be of any
further assistance

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
F O R U S E O F PHOTOAflDEO M A T E R I A L S
S T U D Y T I T L E : Aviation Safety Data Generation and Analysis Using Serious Gaming Methods
DESCRIPTION:
The researchers would also like to take photographs or videotapes of you performing the serious
gaming activity in order to illustrate the research in teaching presentations and/or or publications
CONFIDENTIALITY:
The photo/video materials will be used to extract any additional information that reveals during the
gaming session All matena! will be recorded and stored electronically in Old Dominion University's
secure servers for a penod of 12 months You would not be identified by name in any use of the
photographs or videotapes Even if you agree to be in the study no photographs or videotapes will be
taken of you unless you specifically agree to this
VOLUNTARY CONSENT
By signing below, you are granting to the researchers the right to use your likeness image
appearance and performance - whether recorded on or transferred to videotape film slides
photographs - for presenting or publishing this research No use of photos or video images will be
made other than for professional presentations or publications The researchers are unable to
provide any monetary compensation for use of these materials You can withdraw your voluntary
consent at any time

If you have any questions later on then the researchers should be able to answer them
Dr Adrian Gheorghe (Principal Investigator) 757-277-6280 agheorgh@odu edu
Dr Sharon M Jones (Technical Monitor) 757-864-7642 Sharon m jones@nasa gov
Ersin Ancel (Graduate Research Assistant) 757-272-2364 eance001@odu edu
If at any time you feel pressured to participate or if you have any questions about your rights or this
form, then you should call Dr George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or the Old
Dominion University Office of Research at 757 683 3460

Subject's Printed Name & Signature

Date

APPENDIX E - ENABLER DEFINITIONS, COST, TIMELINE AND BENEFITS

Runway Safety and Collision Avoidance Category
Accident Category
(CICTT Occurrence
Citegory)

increased
Capacity/Safety
Related Runway
Operations,
(Rt-VAP,GCOL,
RAMP)

[R2J
Runway Visibility
(Low and nearzero visibility), (RlVAP/A, GCOL,
TAXI)

Prerequisites

Enabler

Expert
Estimated Fully
Operational
Benefits

Addresses

Collision with
ASDE-X, Runway
Incursion Reduction
Program

Runway Status Lights
(RWSL), Synthetic Vision
(2016), Moving Maps
(2018), Terminal Area
Hazard Sensor (NASA,
2009 IIFD.SS.3 External
Hazard Detection)

A/C, ground
handling
caused by
Increased
volume

Collision with
A/C, animal,
person, ground
handling
caused by low
visibility

%90ofall
increased
capacity
induced runway
accidents

% 80 of All
visibility related
runway
accidents

Timeline

Level l : 2017 (JPDO,
2008a, App 1-9),
Level 2:2025 (JPDO,
2008A App 1-16)

Level 1 (Low Visibility
Surface Ops): 2017
(JPDO, 2008A App 1-9)
Level 2 (Near Zero
Visibility Surface Ops):

2025 (JPDO, 2008A
App 1-16)

Costs by Timeline

Enabler Overall
Benefit ft
Probability
Number

FAA ASDE-X
($4.2M), ADS-B
Levels

4.92% (0.279)

FAA Runway Status
Lights (Level
2]($55M), FAA
Runway Incursion
Program [Level 1]
($5M), Moving
Maps ($1.3M FAA
FY2011 p.F&E-72)

11.60% (0.659)

Runway Incursion and ASOE-X require ADS-B (In & Out)

Aircraft Systems Reliability Category
Accident Category
(CICTT Occurrence
Category)

lA/ei)
Powerplant related
system/ component
malfunction or failure
[SCF-PP]

Enabler

Addresses

Expert Estimated
Fully Operational
Benefits

Timeline

Costs by Timeline

IVHM;$26.4M/yr,A/C
Level 1:2015,
Powerplant related system,
Catastrophic Failure
Propulsion HMS,
Level 2:2025,
component malfunction or
Research (FAA FY2011
Aircraft
* ..
c _x
• 0-50% of propulsion „ „ _ _ -,™>* c
failure, Surface anomaly
,
.
,J
(JPDO, 2008A EAHF,$l.lM/yr),
Catastrophic
acc,aents
detection on critical PP remm
3054,3055 App It- Continued Airworthiness:
Failure Research
93)
components
$570,OG0/yr

[A/C 2]
Airframe related
system/ component
failure or malfunction
[SCF-NP]

Airframe HMS,
Continued
Airworthiness
(Structures)

[AC 3]
Software and Systems
related system/
component failure or
malfunction [SCF-NP]

A/C Systems
HMS, Software
HMS, Digital
System Safety

Airframe related
system/ component
failure or malfunction,
Damage tolerance
methods and detection
technologies

80% of Airframe
related accidents

Software and A/C Systems
related system/
80% of all
component failure or
software/systems
malfunction, Develop V&V
related accidents
techniques, software
development assurance

Respective
Probability
Number

1.89% (0.107)

Level 1: 2015,
Level 2: 2025,

IVHM: $26.4M/yr,
(JPDO, 2008A E- Continued Airworthiness:
$3,718,000/yr
3054,3055 App

0.17% (0.010)

11-93)

Level 1:2015,

JVHM:$26.4M/yr, Digital
System Safety (FAA
Levet 2: 2025,
(JPDO,2008AE- FY2011AUD):$2.2M/yr
3054,3055 App Continued Airworthiness:
$l,5M/yr
11-93)

6.72% (0.382)

long
Accident Category
(CICTT Occurrence
Category)

Enabler

Iced Airframe
Aerodynamics Modeling
and Prediction Methods
HI]
(NASA, 2009b, 2.1.3)
A/C aerodynamics and Atmospheric Hazards control surfaces [ICE] Icing, p.RE&D-30) Icing
Remote Sensing &
Characterization NASA,
2009a, .SS.4

[I 2J
Engine Icing
[FUEL on icing]

External Hazard - Icing
(NASA, 2009a, .SS.3)
Engine Icing Modeling
(NASA, 2009b 2.2.3)
Advanced Sensors and
Materials (NASA 2009c,
1.1.1.2)

Expert
Estimated
Fully
Operational
Benefits

Costs by Timeline

Respective
Probability
Number

Aircraft modeling and
Level 1:2015
icing formation related
Level
2:2025,
70% ©f A/C icing
to ice accumulation and
(Airborne
icing
Related
related
its effects on aircraft
Accident
Mitigation
accidents
aerodynamics and
JPDO,2O08AENcontrol surfaces
3127/28)

Atmospheric
Hazards-Icing, US
(DoT 2010a
,p.RE&O-30) to
Glenn RC
($1,919,000)

0.15%
(0.008)

Level 1:2015
Level 2: 2025
(Airborne icing Related
Accident Mitigation
JPDO, 2008a EN3127/28)

FAA FY2011 AUK,
P.RE&D-87
Weather Program
(S7.3M)

0.19%
(0.011)

Addresses

Engine modeling and
icing formation related
to ice accumulation and
its effects on the
powerplant

90% of El
accidents

Timeline

Airborne Collision c nd Loss of Separation
Accident Category
(aCTT Occurrence
Category)

[Cll
Near Mid-Air Collision
/TCAS Alerts

[C2]
Loss of Separation
(Separation
Assurance)

Prerequisites

Enabler

Addresses

Expert Estimated
Fully Operational
Benefits

Timeline

Costs by
Timeline

Respective
Probability
Number

TCAS Enhancements

Risk of Mid-Air
Collision, Near
Collision, ACAS
Alerts

50% of collision
related incidents

Operational: 2016
(JPDO, 2008b, V1.0 p.9)

FAA TCAS
Enhancements
($2.5M)

1.05% (0.060)

70% of collision
related incidents

2 Levels, 2014 &
2020
(JPDO, 2008a
Surveillance Services
p. 10-3 & E-1023,
1400)

FAA WAAS for
GPS ($85M)
FAA ADS-B
($176M)
(FY2012-15
$969M)

2.50% (0.142)

ADS-B, TIS-B, FIS-B,
Wide Area
Augmentation
System for GPS

Loss of
Separation

toss of Separation Assurance require ADS-S (ln& Out)

Weather
Accident
Category (aCTT
Occurrence
Category)

Enabler

Addresses

Expert
Estimated
Fully
Operational

Timeline

Costs by
Timeline

FAA NextGen
FIS-B, Data Link, (JPDO,
Level 1( Initial
Network
2008a: Weather
Enabled
Capability):2013
Consolidated Winter Storm NextGen
Forecasts - Consolidated
fWll
Weather
Level 2 (Adaptive
initial(l), intermediate (2) and fully
50% of
Winter Storm JPDO,
Thunderstorm/
Control/Enhanced
($28.25M)
operational (3) predictive models Thunderstorm
2008A Appendix I I Lightning
Forecast):
2018
(FY2012-15:
and current weather observation
related
p.82), Integrated
(WSTRW)
S145M)
Information to users via Network
accidents Level 3 (Full NextGen):
Weather In the Cockpit
2022
FAA
Weather in
Enabled Infrastructure
(DoT, 2011a A12E, p.
(JPDO, 2008a Sect.
the Cockpit
RE&D-134)
4.2)
Program
($8,369,000)

[W2]
CFIT due to Low
Visibility

Prerequisites

Synthetic Vision
Enhancements and
Human aspects

Enhanced accuracy of net-enabled
deterministic and advanced
probabilistic weather forecast
information for NAS decision making. 70% of CFIT due 2016(DoT, 2011a
Level 2022 integrates weather
to low visibility A12D, p.RE&D-121)
information from ground, airborne,
and satellite sensors broadcast realtime

$3,162,000
(FAA FY2011
Budget,
P.RE&D-128)

Network Enabled Infrastructure (DATA Communications) ($153M) (FY2012-15: $1.89B)

Respective
Probability
Number

0.63%
(0.036)

0.59%
(0.033)

Turbulence
Accident Category
(CICTT I
Category)

Enabler

[T1J
In Flight Turbulence
Encounter
[TURB]

FLI (Forward Looking
Interferometric)
[IIFD.SS.1J

Expert
Estimated
Fully
Operational
Benefits

Costs by Timeline

Respective
Probability
Number

80% reduction in
2011 Feasibility
In Flight
Operational: 2017
Turbulence

$9,517,000 (NextGen
Wake Turbulence
Avoidance)
*HFD: $16M (See cost
assumptions)

18.82% (1.069)

Reduce the impact
FLI
of wake vortices on
Aircraft Characteristics
operations, allowing
Level 1: 2015
[T2J
Database, Aircraft Wake
more closely spaced 90% reduction in Level 2:2020
Ground Wake Vortices
Database,
arrival and departure Ground Wake (JPDO, 2008A App
[TURB-ground
Wake Transport Model
operations to
related accidents IOI-0400-401based]
Wake Decay Model
maintain
402-403)
Wind Based Wake
airport/runway
Procedures
capacity safely.

$3,000,000 (FAA Wake
Turbulence (Recategorization))
NASA, 2009a - FLI
$43M/yr
$4.4M Wake
Turbulence Mitigation
(Arrivals and
Departures DoT,
2010a, F&E-74)

0.76% (0.043)

Addresses

Detects clear air
turbulence (CAT)

Timeline
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APPENDIX F - CAST/ICAO COMMON TAXONOMY TEAM ACCIDENT CATEGORIES
AND DATA

Table Fl outlines the data regarding selected accident categories associated with FAR Part
121 during 1997 and 2006, providing the historical safety risk among large U.S. commercial air
carriers. The percentages for each primary accident category are based on the Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) taxonomies.
However, regarding the two categories regarding the airborne collision category (CI and C2),
due to the extreme nature of such accidents occurring, incident data were assumed to replace
accident data for consistency purposes.
Table-Fl Accident Categories and Respective Data
Respective
CICTT Occurrence Category

Methodology
Category

Total Accidents

Number of
Accidents

Percentage

459

459

Runway Incursion

R2

5

1.1%

Ground Collision-Taxi

Rl

21

4.4%

Ground Collision - Ramp

R2

14.5%

TCAS Alert
Loss of Separation (includes
NMAC)

CI

69
10 (incidents)

C2

17 (incidents)

3.6%

-

Mid Air Collision

2.1%

0.0%

SCF - Powerplant

A/Cl

0
20

4.2%

SCF - Structure

A/C 2

1

0.2%

SCF - Systems

A/C 4

40

8.4%

Icing - Engine

12

1

0.2%

Icing - Surface

11

1

0.2%

Limited Visibility

W2

4

Turbulence Encounter

Tl

112

0.8%
23.5%

Thunderstorm/Windshear

Wl

6

1.3%

Wake Turbulence

T2
-

4

0.8%

7

1.5%

Abnormal Runway Contact

-

38

8.0%

Aerodrome

-

6

1.3%

Bird Strikes

-

14

2.9%

Cabin Safety

-

5

1.1%

Evacuation

-

6

1.3%

R2

53

11.1%

-

1

0.2%

Abrupt Maneuver

Ground Handling
Low Altitude Operations

151

Loss of Control - In Flight

-

2

0.4%

Loss of Control - On Ground

-

3

0.6%

2

0.4%

22

4.6%

4

0.8%

2

0.4%

A/Cl

Loss of Engine Power
Runway Excursion

-

Security Related
Unknown

Table F2 provides the NTSB accident data for the past 10 years, (2000 - 2009) . The
average accident values (0.208 Accidents/100,0O0FH) and average fatalities (0.291
Fatalities/100,000FH) are used as the baseline values for probability and consequences
baselines within the probability number method. The 2001 values are adjusted in order to
exclude the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks resulted in 4 fatal accidents with 246
casualties, and these values are subtracted from the original accident data values. The original
(adjusted) values are as follows: 46 (42), 6 (2), 525 (279).
Table-F2 NTSB Accident Data for FAR Part 121

Year

All
Fatal
Aboard
Accidents Accidents Fatalities

Flight
Hours

Accidents/
lOOKFH

Fatal
Fatalities/
Accidents
lOOKFH
/100FH

2000

56

3

92

18,299,257

0.306

0.016

0.503

2001*

42

2

279

17,814,191

0.236

0.011

1.566

2002

41

0

0

17,290,198

0.237

0.000

0.000

2003

54

2

21

17,467,700

0.309

0.011

0.120

2004

30

2

14

18,882,503

0.159

0.011

0.074

2005

40

3

20

19,390,029

0.206

0.015

0.103

49

19,263,209

0.171

0.010

0.254
0.005

2006

33

2

2007

28

1

1

19,637,322

0.143

0.005

2008

28

2

1

19,097,962

0.147

0.010

0.005

2009

30

2

51

18,001,000

0.167

0.011

0.283

Average

0.208

0.010

0.291

Table 3 above provides the accident categories that are covered within the probability
number method, and it totals 76.5% of the accidents given in the table. The total actual accident
reduction in each category (assumed the respective technologies are fully implemented)
reaches 61.45% of the total accidents covered within the 6 major categories.

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table5.htm

Table F3 Accident Percentages, Categories and Respective N numbers

Category

Accidents

Enabler Contribution

Actual Reduction
of Accident

Respective N

Rl

4.4%

0.9

3.97%

0.225603022

0.9

24.01%

1.364361136

R2
CI

2.1%

0.5

1.05%

0.059683339

C2

3.6%

0.7

2.50%

0.142046347

A/Cl

4.2%

0.5

1.89%

0.107430011

0.8

0.17%

0.009549334

0.8

6.72%

0.381973371

0.7

0.15%

0.008355667

" * ^ * T * r V i *+„,e1

0.9

0.19%
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